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We explore the implications of the widely accepted understanding that competition 
law is common—or “judge-made”—law. Specifically, we ask how the rule of reason 
in antitrust law should be shaped and implemented, not just to guide correct 
application of existing law to the facts of a case, but also to enable courts to participate 
constructively in the common law-like evolution of antitrust law in the light of 
changes in economic learning and business and judicial experience. We explore these 
issues in the context of a recently decided case, Ohio v. American Express, and 
conclude that the Supreme Court, not only made several substantive errors, but also 
did not apply the rule of reason in a way that enabled an effective common law-like 
evolution of antitrust law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[N]o statute,” Justice Scalia observed, “can be entirely precise, and .	.	. 
some judgments, even some judgments involving policy considerations, must 
be left to the officers executing the law and to the judges applying it.”1 This 
is particularly true of antitrust law because the core antitrust statutes are very 
brief and imprecise.2 Indeed, as the Supreme Court explained in National 
Society of Professional Engineers, “[t]he legislative history makes it perfectly 
clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad 
mandate by drawing on common law tradition.”3 Accordingly, “[f]rom the 
 
1 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
2 In pertinent part, the Sherman Act prohibits agreements “in restraint of trade,” 15 U.S.C. §	1 
(2018), and “monopoliz[ing]” or “attempt[ing] to monopolize any part of trade or commerce,” 15 
U.S.C. §	2 (2018); the Clayton Act prohibits mergers whose effect “may be substantially to lessen 
competition,” 15 U.S.C. §	18 (2018); and the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits “unfair 
methods of competition,” 15 U.S.C. §	45 (2018). None of those terms is defined in the statutes. 
Because it enables flexibility, the imprecision of the statutes is probably a good thing. The antitrust 
laws apply to almost all commercial conduct that affects interstate commerce. Those laws must, 
therefore, be suitable for a vast and ever-changing array of conduct and circumstances, the effects of 
which might be discernable only after extensive, detailed, and case-specific factual inquiry. 
3 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). 
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beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”4 
In effect, Congress has delegated to the courts the fleshing out of both the 
normative standards to be applied in assessing conduct and the process by 
which courts determine whether these standards are violated. This delegation 
“permits the law to adapt to new learning.”5 
The courts have two fundamental functions in such an institutional 
setting. First, the courts must identify applicable normative rules and 
principles, both substantive and institutional, to guide antitrust decisions. By 
substantive, we mean those that further the fundamental objectives of antitrust 
law, which are encompassed at present in the “consumer welfare standard.”6 
By institutional, we mean legal rules and principles that: (a) are administrable 
by generalist courts; (b) base decisions on matters that are in principle 
provable by the kinds of evidence that are likely to be available as a practical 
matter; (c) tend to minimize error costs; and (d) offer predictable guidance 
for the public. The second function is the one commonly ascribed to the 
courts: to assess the facts in a case in the light of the normative rules and 
principles and render a decision. Antitrust courts generally rely on various 
forms of a structured rule of reason in fulfilling both functions.7 
In a common law-like process, neither function can be well served by 
imagining a static world in which normative legal standards and institutional 
considerations can be taken as fixed. Both must be understood, and refined as 
 
4 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007). Daniel Crane 
recently suggested a somewhat different way of describing the process: 
[T]he antitrust laws reside in perennial tension between two fundamental impulses of 
the American political psyche—the romantic and idealistic attachment to smallness 
over bigness, and the pragmatic and often grudging realization that large scale 
organization may be necessary to achieve economic efficiency. Congress expresses 
populist idealism through legislative pronouncements reigning in big business, but 
then implicitly acquiesces as the courts (often in conjunction with the executive 
branch) read down the statutes to strike a balance between the aspirational and 
pragmatic impulses. 
Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antitextualism, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3561870 
[https://perma.cc/KEW7-AHHU]. In effect, “the judiciary has treated the antitrust statutes 
as broad delegations to the courts to create a pragmatic common law of competition	.	.	.	.” 
Id. at 36. 
5 William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion and the “Common Law” Nature 
of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 666 (1982). 
6 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, On the Meaning of Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle, 
REVUE CONCURRENTALISTE (Jan. 17, 2020), https://leconcurrentialiste.com/herbert-hovenkamp-
meaning-consumer-welfare/ [https://perma.cc/AW8Y-9MKV]. 
7 We ignore for present purposes the per se rule, which applies to only a very narrow range of 
conduct and was not implicated in the American Express case. That rule is, in any event, a short-cut 
intended to achieve the same ends as the rule of reason in specified circumstances in which more 
extended factual inquiry is deemed unnecessary. 
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appropriate, in the light of advances in economic learning and judicial 
experience that are relevant to the pending case while at the same time giving 
appropriate deference to precedent. As the Supreme Court explained in 
Leegin, “[j]ust as the common law adapts to modern understanding and greater 
experience, so too does the Sherman Act’s prohibition on ‘restraint[s] of trade’ 
evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions.”8 
We examine the implications of the common law nature of antitrust for the 
development and application of the rule of reason.9 We argue that the antitrust 
rule of reason should be shaped, not just to guide correct application of existing 
law to the facts of the case (the second fundamental judicial function), but also 
to enable the courts to participate constructively in the common law-like 
evolution of antitrust law in the light of changes in economic learning and 
business and judicial experience (the first fundamental judicial function). 
Recent litigation involving American Express10 offers an excellent setting 
in which to examine this issue. The case raised central questions regarding 
the antitrust treatment of a very important business model that had not 
previously been addressed in antitrust cases. It culminated in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ohio v. American Express Company.11 
American Express acts as a “platform” that facilitates interactions between 
card-accepting merchants and card-holding consumers. Many of the world’s 
most prominent firms operate similar platform business models that facilitate 
interactions among different groups of users. For example, Amazon joins 
merchants and consumers; Apple joins app sellers with iPhone and iPad users 
through the App Store; Facebook and Google connect advertisers with 
consumers engaged in social networking and online search, respectively; and 
Uber joins drivers and riders. Although neither the platform business model nor 
antitrust litigation regarding platform conduct is new,12 the platform business 
 
8 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899 (2007) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §	1 (2006)). 
9 The rule of reason is itself a reflection of the common law nature of antitrust: 
Thus not specifying but indubitably contemplating and requiring a standard, it follows 
that it was intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the common 
law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the 
statute, was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether 
in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which 
the statute provided. 
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). 
10 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 
(2d Cir. 2016), aff ’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
11 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
12 Newspapers have long acted as platforms that allow advertisers to reach consumers, and 
credit and debit card networks have long served as intermediaries between merchants and 
consumers. For examples of major antitrust cases against platforms, see Lorain Journal Co. v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (reviewing an injunction against a newspaper publisher selling both 
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model has become increasingly prominent—especially for platforms with digital 
infrastructures—and there have been very significant developments in recent 
years in the economic analysis of platform competition.13 Indeed, research on 
platform competition has been the most active area of competition economics 
research over the past fifteen years. And, while earlier cases involved platform 
businesses—including payment networks—the litigation involving American 
Express is the first to focus specifically on how to account for the possibility that 
the challenged conduct has opposing effects on user welfare on different sides 
of the platform, as well as the first to consider how the new economic learning 
about platforms should inform antitrust doctrine. 
It appears likely that platform competition will be one of the most active areas 
of antitrust litigation over the coming decade. A healthy common law-like process 
would enable the law to adapt as appropriate in the light of new learning and new 
experience. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in the American Express case 
applied the rule of reason in a way that hinders such adaptation. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF COMPETITION LAW 
The antitrust statutes are broad and general, and antitrust law applies to 
almost all aspects of commerce.14 Judicial decision making in antitrust thus 
needs to be able to adapt to: (a) the development of new technologies, 
business models, and market circumstances; (b) the evolution of economic 
thinking with respect to both substantive antitrust standards and fact-finding 
tools that is the result of new theoretical work and empirical findings; and (c) 
the accumulation of judicial experience with respect to the application of 
antitrust principles in litigation. 
The broad nature of the antitrust statutes makes it relatively straightforward 
to account for new technologies and business models when they can be 
adequately assessed by generally accepted economic principles, frameworks, and 
techniques. And the courts are well suited to engage in the fact-intensive, case-
 
advertising and newspapers); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(reviewing an injunction against credit card companies serving both banks and merchants); United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 71-72 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (reviewing an 
injunction against an operating system serving applications developers and PC users); United States 
v. Florists’ Telegraph Delivery Ass’n, 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,367, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4016 
(E.D. Mich. June 1, 1956) (enjoining a florist-by-wire association serving florist shops receiving 
orders and florist shops fulfilling orders). 
13 For an overview, see generally Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A 
Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006); Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 
J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2009, at 125. 
14 See supra note 2. 
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specific inquiries required to determine how existing principles can be adapted 
to new business practices and market circumstances.15 
But what happens when there is disagreement as to whether or how 
existing economic principles apply to new forms of conduct? And how can 
the courts incorporate new economic learning when there is no consensus 
even among economists regarding what constitutes valid new learning? These 
questions can arise both with respect to new forms of commercial conduct for 
which there are no applicable legal precedents and for familiar forms of 
conduct when new learning calls into question existing precedents. The latter 
raises the question of when fidelity to legal precedent should apply to 
economic reasoning embedded or assumed in legal propositions.16 
In a common law process, the law arises inductively from decided cases, 
rather than deductively from statutes or other codes. In effect, courts decide 
individual cases, and the legal principle on which a decision is based is 
inferred from the decision and the facts of the case. That principle is then 
applicable in future cases decided by that or inferior courts. The obligation of 
courts to apply that principle in future cases is embodied in the notion of 
stare decisis. Broadly speaking, stare decisis enables courts to decide cases 
without rethinking legal questions that have already been addressed, helps 
ensure that like cases are decided in a similar fashion, and thus enhances the 
predictability and perceived fairness and legitimacy of the law. 
But stare decisis is subject to two important limitations, which enable the 
law to evolve. First, the decision in an earlier case need not control a later 
case if the later case is different in ways that make application of the earlier 
decision inappropriate. Lawyers and courts thus need to determine whether 
the later case is distinguishable from the earlier case. Legal principles do not 
have to be cast aside whenever there are material new facts. But the extension 
of a legal principle to materially different circumstances is not an application 
of stare decisis; it is instead the creation of a new legal rule or the modification 
of an old one. 
Second, the earlier case can be overruled—its legal principle rejected—if 
it no longer seems appropriate or correct.17 This second limitation on stare 
 
15 This is not to deny the value of experience. The examination of multiple cases may generate 
a better understanding of the effects of a new practice. 
16 Such legal propositions include, for example: the rule that predatory pricing requires prices 
below an appropriate measure of cost, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993); the rule that two products exist for tying purpose only when there is 
sufficient demand for unbundled components that it would be profitable for the defendant to 
provide an unbundled option, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21-22 
(1984); and the use of market shares to determine whether the defendant has market power, e.g., 
United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 342-43 (1963). 
17 Lower courts may not overrule decisions of a higher court, but any court may overrule its own 
earlier decisions or decisions of lower courts. 
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decisis does not mean that legal precedents should be overruled whenever 
they are thought to be incorrect. To the contrary, in a case involving the 
interpretation of a federal statute, the Supreme Court explained that  
stare decisis has consequence only to the extent it sustains incorrect decisions; 
correct judgments have no need for that principle to prop them up. 
Accordingly, an argument that we got something wrong—even a good 
argument to that effect—cannot by itself justify scrapping settled precedent. 
Or otherwise said, it is not alone sufficient that we would decide a case 
differently now than we did then. To reverse course, we require as well what 
we have termed a ‘special justification’—over and above the belief ‘that the 
precedent was wrongly decided.’18 
Stare decisis in antitrust law is, however, somewhat different. For one 
thing, the courts are engaged in a common law-like process in which almost 
all law is judge made. Although antitrust decisions require attention to 
precedent, they rarely require careful attention to statutory language or 
legislative history.19 The Court put it this way in Kimble: 
This Court has viewed stare decisis as having less-than-usual force in cases 
involving the Sherman Act. Congress, we have explained, intended that law’s 
reference to “restraint of trade” to have “changing content,” and authorized 
courts to oversee the term’s “dynamic potential.” We have therefore felt 
relatively free to revise our legal analysis as economic understanding evolves 
and (just as Kimble notes) to reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a 
practice’s competitive consequences.20 
The role of stare decisis in antitrust law is complicated also because of the 
role of economic analysis in antitrust law. Economics is commonly used in a 
wide variety of legal contexts to help resolve factual issues, such as quantifying 
damages. But antitrust law is almost unique in the extent to which legal 
doctrine is based on economic propositions about which generalist judges have no 
particular expertise. Consequently, the common law of antitrust must grapple 
with a question that does not generally arise in other areas: how should the 
courts account for new learning about economic propositions when defining 
 
18 Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (citation omitted).  
19 Stare decisis is sometimes said to have more force in matters of statutory interpretation, 
where legislative action to correct mistaken judicial rulings might reasonably be expected, than in 
matter of constitutional interpretation, where correction by amendment is very unlikely. See, e.g., 
Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1412-13 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part); Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S., 203, 235 (1997). Because the substantive antitrust statutes have been amended only 
very rarely and have delegated much of the law making to the courts, it is not clear that those laws 
are, or should be, regarded as the kinds of statutes for which legislative action to correct mistaken 
juridical rulings can be expected. 
20 Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412-13 (citations omitted). 
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or shaping the law (antitrust doctrine) itself? An important part of the answer 
to that question begins with the recognition that, to the extent antitrust 
precedents and doctrine are rooted in economics, they generally are based on 
empirical propositions. Even rudimentary notions, such as that demand 
curves slope downward, are ultimately empirical propositions. 
This reliance of antitrust doctrine on empirical or instrumental economic 
propositions has two implications for the role of stare decisis. The first is that 
stare decisis enables antitrust cases to be tried without the parties’ having to 
litigate basic economic principles, such as whether demand curves generally 
slope downward. The second is that antitrust precedents based on empirical 
or instrumental economic propositions—propositions that are exogenous to 
the legal process itself—are entitled to less deference than ordinary 
precedents if those economic propositions are subsequently understood to be 
incorrect. This is so for three reasons. First, judges are not experts in 
economics, and an earlier court’s embrace of an empirical or instrumental 
economic proposition is thus entitled to less deference than its adopting 
normative or legal propositions. Second, a case that superficially appears to 
be like another might in substance be very different when the underlying 
economics are understood.21 Third, economic propositions evolve over time 
as new theoretical and empirical research is conducted, so prior articulations 
of legal principles purporting to embrace economic propositions might need 
to be revised to account for an updated understanding of the underlying 
economics. A legal principle that might have made eminent sense when first 
adopted might thus come to be imprudent in the light of subsequent 
economic learning and marketplace and judicial experience.22 
The reliance of antitrust doctrine on empirical or instrumental economic 
propositions has a another important implication: antitrust principles ought 
 
21 In the Microsoft case, for example, the court held that conduct that was in form like the kinds 
of conduct that had previously been regarded as unlawful per se should treated differently because 
of the different industry and economic circumstances. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 
34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam). 
22 Herbert Hovenkamp argues that stare decisis should be applied to modes of analysis rather 
than categories of practices: 
[T]he important fact	.	.	.	is that the distinction between naked and ancillary restraints 
enables the court to determine early on whether and how much further inquiry is 
necessary. The proper role of stare decisis lies in the legal formulation that “significant 
and naked restraints are unlawful per se”—not in the categorical and overgeneralized 
conclusions that “price fixing,” “tying,” or “market division” are per se unlawful. 
IP Ties and Microsoft’s Rule of Reason, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 369, 381 (2002); see also Herbert 
Hovenkamp The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81 (2018) (stating that different “modes of analysis” 
are used to assist courts with the complexity of antitrust cases). Our analysis, however, suggests that 
the application of stare decisis to modes of analysis can also be problematical when the courts 
prematurely reach holdings with respect to them. 
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to be testable as part of the common law process. Some antitrust principles—
such as the use of market definition and market share to assess market 
power—are testable at least in part by judicial experience, which can 
illuminate whether and how market definition and market share do or do not 
accurately assess market power. Others, such as a rule that defines predatory 
pricing as requiring proof of facts that can rarely if ever be proven regardless 
of the underlying reality, are not testable by judicial experience because there 
is no way of learning from judicial experience whether the finding of no 
liability reflects a failure of proof given the facts of the particular case or a 
substantively flawed rule.23 
To be sure, judicial experience is far from the only source of learning that 
can inform the evolution of antitrust law. Business experience and academic 
learning are also essential sources of knowledge needed to inform antitrust 
law. Sometimes new academic insights about economics can themselves 
justify new or revised antitrust doctrine. But reliance by courts on academic 
insights should be cautious and humble for several reasons. First, it is 
sometimes difficult to determine which insights are widely understood to be 
sound and which are interesting but not yet established. Second, academic 
learning about economics usually addresses a range of analytical and 
empirical issues of interest to economists but rarely addresses questions about 
how that learning can most effectively be embodied in legal rules suitable for 
application by legal institutions. And judges often lack deep knowledge about 
economics and how to translate economic insight into sound legal rules. 
The implicit premise of stare decisis must be a presumption that the 
existing legal rules are generally sensible, just as the implicit premise in 
overruling or distinguishing an existing rule must be that the later court is 
well-equipped to decide whether those rules are sensible or inapplicable. Both 
those premises would seem less applicable when courts are expected to 
understand economics in order to promulgate or overrule legal principles. 
One might imagine replacing the historical delegation to the courts of law-
making authority with regard to antitrust with a more robust role for Congress. 
There are several reasons to imagine that Congress might be better suited than 
the courts to revise antitrust law in the light of new economic learning. First, 
Congress has the ability to bring much greater resources to bear on an issue. 
 
23 For example, the court in United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1117 (10th Cir. 2003), 
held that a combination of extrinsic evidence and various accounting proxies was not sufficient to 
permit an inference that the defendant’s prices were below cost, or even to put a burden of 
production on the defendant, on the ground that none of the evidence directly measured incremental 
cost. If the court meant that below-cost pricing can be proved only when there is direct evidence of 
the defendant’s incremental cost and cannot be inferred from circumstantial evidence or evidentiary 
proxies, even where the defendant’s records include no such direct evidence, then it would as a 
practical matter make proof of predatory pricing impossible, regardless of the underlying reality. 
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Second, because it can make changes that incorporate new learning outside of 
reaching a decision in a specific case, Congress can give parties advance notice 
of changes, which reduces the degree of uncertainty that businesses face when 
making certain investments. Last, to the extent there is a political element in 
the interpretation of the statutes and the relevant economics, Congress will 
reflect the current political circumstances, by contrast to the courts, which are 
more likely to reflect the political circumstances at the time that the deciding 
judges were appointed. 
But there are also reasons to expect Congress not to be very good at 
legislating detailed antitrust doctrine. Among other things, antitrust issues only 
rarely attract Congressional attention, so legislated rules are likely to be slow 
in coming and might endure long after they have ceased being useful; partisan 
interests often impede Congressional action; and legislators are often more 
motivated by constituent interests or political strategies than by sound policy 
analysis. Perhaps most important, Congress does not decide individual cases. 
It thus lacks the experience and learning that come from actual cases; and the 
lobbyists that seek to influence Congress, by contrast to lawyers and economists 
in litigation, can be expected to address issues at a level of generality that might 
obscure important considerations about how or whether alleged facts might be 
proven and the tractability of legal principles when applied in litigation. 
In any event, by writing brief and imprecise statutes, Congress has 
established a common law-like process, and that is not likely to change. The 
concerns about the ability of courts to wisely embed economic propositions 
in legal rules might suggest some adjustments to the role of stare decisis in 
antitrust cases. First, when adjudicating antitrust cases, courts might be less 
deferential to past decisions that reached conclusions regarding economic 
theories and techniques through a highly imperfect process. Second, holdings 
that incorporate new learning should be narrowly tailored to the specific facts 
of the case at hand until more experience has been accumulated. In Microsoft, 
the D.C. Circuit held “that the rule of reason, rather than per se analysis, 
should govern the legality of tying arrangements involving platform software 
products” because there was not enough experience to apply a per se 
approach.24 The same logic supports judicial restraint with respect to making 
sweeping pronouncements about how to apply new economic principles.25 
There is also another, potentially more important means for courts to help 
optimize the common law evolution of antitrust law: courts should construe and 
apply the rule of reason, not only to aid correct application of existing legal 
 
24 United States vs. Microsoft Corp. 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam). 
25 As we discuss below, the American Express Court violated this principle when it prescribed a 
rigid approach to market definition for a broad class of markets and appeared to make other broad 
rulings as well. See infra Parts V-VI. 
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principles to the facts of the case, but also to facilitate the selection and evolution 
of optimal legal principles. 
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE MEANING THAT HAS EVOLVED IN THIS 
PROCESS 
To provide context for our discussion of the rule of reason, we summarize the 
key substantive principles on which contemporary antitrust law is based. The 
broad objective of antitrust policy is to protect competition in order to promote 
economic welfare. There are two basic elements to any antitrust violation. 
The first is anticompetitive conduct, i.e., conduct that is not “competition on 
the merits” and tends to diminish the competitive constraints imposed by 
rivals.26 Loosely speaking, competition on the merits is conduct that increases 
the benefits that the defendant’s product offers to customers,27 reduces the 
defendant’s cost of supplying its product, or reduces above-cost prices. For 
various reasons having to do with administrability, uncertainty, and the like, 
some conduct that might seem anticompetitive under this definition is not 
deemed to be anticompetitive for antitrust purposes.28 We discuss the 
implications of such legal process concerns for the rule of reason in Section 
V.C below. 
The second element is an increase in market power compared to that in the 
but-for world caused by the anticompetitive conduct. To oversimplify, market 
power is the ability of a firm to profitably increase its prices above competitive 
levels (or, where the firm is a buyer, to drive prices below competitive levels). 
 
26 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58 (“[T]o be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist’s 
act must have an ‘anticompetitive effect.’ That is, it must harm the competitive process	.	.	.	.”); id. at 
59 (defining a “procompetitive justification” for a defendant’s conduct as “a nonpretextual claim that 
its conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits”). 
27 This refers to improvement in an absolute sense. Degrading a rival’s product in order to make one’s 
own product relatively more attractive is not competition on the merits and could be anticompetitive. 
28 For example, a firm that controls access to an input needed by competitors might be thought 
to engage in anticompetitive conduct when it refuses to make that input available to a competitor in 
situations where the refusal entails a profit sacrifice. But courts rarely find refusals to deal with rivals 
to be anticompetitive, in part, because of concerns about false positives and the difficulty of 
determining and enforcing appropriate terms of trade. The Court in Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP explained those concerns as follows: 
The costs of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of §	2 liability.	.	.	. 
Even if the problem of false positives did not exist, conduct consisting of 
anticompetitive violations of §	251 may be, as we have concluded with respect to 
above-cost predatory pricing schemes, ‘beyond the practical ability of a judicial 
tribunal to control.’ Effective remediation of violations of regulatory sharing 
requirements will ordinarily require continuing supervision of a highly detailed 
decree. We think that Professor Areeda got it exactly right: ‘No court should impose 
a duty to deal that it cannot explain or adequately and reasonably supervise.	.	.	.’ 
540 U.S. 398, 414-15 (2004) (citations omitted). 
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The exercise of market power can diminish economic welfare. An increase in 
market power reflects a reduction in the effectiveness of actual or potential 
competitors as constraints on a firm’s conduct. 
In summary, for several decades there has been a consensus that the 
normative objective of antitrust law is to prevent anticompetitive conduct that 
increases market power and thereby reduces economic welfare.29 Meeting this 
objective requires addressing two types of factual issues. One, finding the facts 
in individual cases, is not in principle unique to antitrust law. The second and 
more challenging entails identifying the appropriate instrumental economic 
propositions that link the facts of the case to the normative objectives. Thus, 
for example, a court needs to be able to do more than identify whether tying 
has occurred; it needs to be able to determine whether conditions in the case 
under examination are such that the tying is likely to injure competition. 
III. THE RULE OF REASON 
Today, most antitrust decisions are reached through application of the 
rule of reason, which has itself evolved over time.30 
Based on his comprehensive review of cases over the last decade of 
the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first, Carrier 
summarized a four-step rule of reason as follows: 
1. First, the plaintiff must show either an actual adverse effect on 
competition (direct proof) or a potential adverse effect (proof of 
market power). 
2. Second, if the plaintiff meets its initial burden, then the burden 
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that it has a legitimate 
procompetitive justification for the challenged conduct. 
3. Third, if the defendant satisfies the second step, then the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s 
procompetitive objectives could have been achieved by conduct 
that was less harmful to competition. 
 
29 This consensus is being increasingly questioned by academics, policy advocates, and 
some legislators. See, e.g., Tim Wu, After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The “Protection of 
Competition” in Practice, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (April 2018), 
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3294&context=faculty_scholarship 
[https://perma.cc/N4VV-ERYW] (describing how multiple groups have attacked this consensus on 
different grounds). For purposes of this paper, however, we take the existing consensus as a given. 
30 For a history of the rule of reason, see Andrew I. Gavil, Burden of Proof in U.S. Antitrust Law, 
in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 137-38 (2008). 
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4. Fourth, if the plaintiff fails to establish that the conduct was not 
reasonably necessary to obtain the benefits, then the court balances 
the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the conduct.31 
The basic structure makes sense. It is appropriate in our legal system to 
require a plaintiff to explain the basis for its request for judicial intervention, 
and the plaintiff ought to have a factual basis for its concerns regarding the 
impact of the defendant’s conduct on competition and market power. It is 
appropriate for the defendant to have the burden of demonstrating a 
procompetitive justification, both because it should know what, if any, 
legitimate purpose the allegedly unlawful conduct was intended to serve and 
because the defendant is likely to have better access to evidence about any 
such justification than the plaintiff. And it is appropriate to require the 
plaintiff to have the burden of identifying less restrictive alternatives so that 
the defendant is not in the position of proving a negative, i.e., that there are 
no such alternatives. In fact, if the burden were reversed on any of these three 
steps, the party with the burden would be required to prove a negative—no 
harm to competition, no justification, or no less restrictive alternative.32 
The fourth step is less clear, not because of the allocation of the burden of 
proof, but because it is not clear what balancing or weighing means. It could 
mean determining whether the anticompetitive harms are larger or smaller 
than the procompetitive benefits in the case.33 Alternatively, it could require 
application of a substantive decision rule such as the disproportionality rule 
 
31 Michael A. Carrier, The Four-Step Rule of Reason, 33 ANTITRUST 50, 50-51 (2019). Perhaps 
the most widely quoted judicial articulation of the current rule of reason was set forth by the D.C. 
Circuit in Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58-59. Although there are minor differences, the two 
formulations appear to be substantively equivalent. The court in Microsoft said that the defendant 
must “proffer,” rather than “demonstrate,” a procompetitive justification; but it later rejected a 
proffered justification on the ground that Microsoft did not meet its “burden of showing that its 
conduct serves” a procompetitive purpose. Id. at 67. Also, although Microsoft said that the burden 
shifts back to the defendant to rebut a sufficiently asserted justification, it made no explicit mention 
of rebutting the justification by showing a less restrictive alternative. There is, however, no reason 
to think that the Microsoft court would have found harm to competition that was not necessary to 
achieve an asserted benefit to be justified by the benefit. 
32 The term “rule of reason” is more often used in cases involving Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
than in those involving Section 2 of the Sherman Act or Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The semantic 
issue regarding the use of that term is immaterial for purposes of this article, in which we use the 
term to describe the general approach of cases when applying the antitrust laws. 
33 Making such a determination can be very difficult in practice. For example, there may be no 
obvious way to compare the long-run harm from increased entry barriers due to the challenged 
conduct with short-run benefits from increased product quality due to that conduct. See U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF 
THE SHERMAN ACT 36 (2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4VW2-TB5A], and references therein for a discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of this approach. 
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(which finds a violation only if the harms substantially outweigh the 
benefits).34 
In practice, courts almost never actually engage in the kind of 
explicit balancing contemplated by the fourth step in the rule of 
reason.35 In his review of 222 instances in which a federal court reached 
a final judgment that was at least in part decided under the rule of 
reason between February 2, 1999, and May 5, 2009, Carrier found that 
215 were decided on the ground that the plaintiff failed to show 
anticompetitive effect and only 5 reached the balancing stage.36 Other 
commentators have suggested, however, that balancing might occur in 
more subtle and informal ways.37 
IV. UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN EXPRESS 
When a consumer makes a purchase from a merchant and uses an Amex card 
as payment, American Express charges the merchant a fee equal to a percentage 
of the transaction value.38 In many cases, American Express also provides financial 
rewards and other benefits to the cardholder.39 American Express often charges 
merchants higher fees than do other credit and charge card networks.40 
 
34 See id. at 45 and references therein for a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of this 
approach. A different substantive decision rule, the no-economic-sense test (which requires that the 
conduct would not be profitable—and would thus make no economic sense for the defendant—but 
for the anticompetitive benefits it generates for the defendant), could also be characterized as a kind 
of balancing rule, but it is more often thought of as an alternative to balancing. See id. at 39 and 
references therein for a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. 
35 See Carrier, supra note 31, at 51 (finding that balancing happens in only four percent of 
cases). Andrew Gavil describes this balancing as a myth: 
Such “rule of reason balancing” is perhaps the greatest myth in all of U.S. antitrust law. 
It is almost always described as the final step in the rule of reason analysis, yet few, if any, 
decisions turned on a true balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects. Instead, most 
cases turn on the strength and weight of the evidence of effects or efficiencies. 
Supra note 30, at 147. 
36 Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 827, 828-829 (2009). For an examination of earlier data, see generally Michael 
A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, which 
summarizes outcomes of “rule of reason” cases based on survey results. 
37 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures: Antitrust, Title VII 
Disparate Impact, and Constitutional Law Strict Scrutiny, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1405-07 (2019). 
38 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The merchant 
discount fee paid by the merchant generally consists of an ad valorem element—i.e., a percentage 
discount rate multiplied by the purchase price—but may include additional flat fees.”). Id. at 158 
(“American Express charges a single discount rate for all Amex credit and charge products, in 
addition to certain flat fees charged on a per transaction basis.”). 
39 These reward structures vary from “the high-rewards Platinum Card, the ‘bedrock of [Amex’s] 
brand,’” to “its cards with less generous rewards, like the Green Card or EveryDay Credit Card.” Id. 
40 Id. at 200. 
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Consequently, merchants may want to try to induce Amex cardholders to make 
purchases using alternative networks.41 Between eighty and ninety percent of 
Amex cardholders also carry other general purpose credit cards.42 
Subject to limited exceptions, American Express refuses to authorize 
merchants to accept its cards unless they agree not to try to “steer” their 
customers to competing general purpose credit and charge cards.43 American 
Express’s no-steering provisions forbid a merchant that accepts American 
Express cards from, among other things, offering the merchant’s customers a 
discount or some form of reward in return for using a competing credit or 
charge card operating on the Discover, MasterCard, or Visa networks that 
charges a lower merchant fee.44 The no-steering provisions also limit 
merchants’ ability to use written or oral communications to influence 
consumers’ choices among competing general purpose credit and charge 
cards.45 For example, American Express’s rules prohibit a merchant from 
saying to a customer at the point of sale “you are welcome to use your Amex 
card to pay for your purchase, but we would like you to know that it will cost 
us more than if you use a credit card issued on another network.”46 
The United States and seventeen States sued American Express, alleging 
that its no-steering rules violate §1 of the Sherman Act because they have 
excluded rivals, diminished price competition among card issuers, and 
directly harmed merchants.47 The specific mechanism alleged is that the rules 
reduce the incentives for credit and charge card networks to offer favorable 
terms to merchants because, absent the no-steering provisions, merchants 
might respond to better terms by steering their customers to the network 
offering those improved terms, thus increasing the incentives of networks to 
offer such terms.48 
American Express argued that its no-steering rules protect its ability to 
pursue a “differentiated business model” under which it competes by charging 
high merchant fees to fund cardholder benefits, and that this business model 
 
41 Id. at 150 (“[A] given merchant might prefer that a customer carrying both a Visa card and 
an Amex card in her wallet use the Visa card, since the cost of the transaction is likely to be lower 
for the merchant.”). 
42 Id. at 191. 
43 Id. at 162-64. 
44 Id. at 165 (listing examples of merchant steering behavior prohibited by American Express’s rules). 
45 Id. at 162-63 (summarizing the limitations on merchant steering behavior under American 
Express’s standard terms). 
46 Such a statement would be prohibited by the provision that a merchant may not “indicate or imply 
that [it] prefer[s], directly or indirectly, any Other Payment Products over [Amex’s] Card.” Id. at 162. 
47 Id. at 149-150. 
48 Id. at 210 (“In effect, Amex’s [anti-steering rules] deny its competitors the ability to 
recognize a ‘competitive reward’ for offering merchants lower swipe fees, and thereby suppress an 
important avenue of horizontal interbrand competition.”). 
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drives increased innovation and competition.49 American Express also argued 
that its no-steering rules prevent competing networks from free riding on 
American Express’s investments in providing certain benefits to cardholders 
and merchants and, thus, preserve American Express’s incentives to make 
these investments.50 
The district court found for the plaintiffs.51 The court found, among other 
things, that the rules: (i) reduce incentives for American Express and its rivals 
to compete with respect to merchant fees because merchants are prohibited 
from encouraging their customers to use lower-cost networks, which otherwise 
would have increased the benefits to networks from cutting their prices;52 (ii) 
for the same reason exclude Discover and other rivals that seek to compete on 
the basis of low merchant fees;53 (iii) result in higher merchant fees charged 
by Amex and its credit card rivals;54 (iv) do not lead to offsetting improvement 
in benefits or services for Amex cardholders;55 and (v) thus result in both 
higher merchant fees and a higher “net” (or “two-sided”) price for American 
Express’s services.56 The district court also found that American Express’s no-
steering rules harm consumers in general.57 
The Second Circuit reversed.58 The court held that the district court erred 
in defining the relevant market59 and asserted that “[p]laintiffs bore the 
burden in this case to prove net harm to Amex consumers as a whole—that 
is, both cardholders and merchants—by showing that Amex’s 
nondiscriminatory provisions have reduced the quality or quantity of credit-
card purchases.”60 The court pointed to “evidence showing that the quality 
and output of credit cards across the entire industry continues to increase,” 
which it took to be proof that Amex’s conduct had harmed neither 
competition nor consumers.61 
 
49 Id. at 225. 
50 Id. at 234-235. 
51 Id. at 238. 
52 Id. at 207-08. 
53 Id. at 213-14. 
54 Id. at 213-15. 
55 Id. at 196, 215-16. 
56 Id. at 215. 
57 Id. at 208 (“In this case, Plaintiffs additionally are able to show harm to those same 
merchants’ customers on the other side of the [general purpose credit and charge card] platform, as 
inflated merchant discount rates are passed on to all customers—Amex cardholders and non-
cardholders alike—in the form of higher retail prices.”). 
58 United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir. 2016). 
59 Id. at 196-200. 
60 Id. at 206-207. 
61 Id. at 207. The court also asserted, “[t]his evidence of increased output is	.	.	.	also consistent 
with evidence that Amex’s differentiated closed-loop model, supported by its [challenged conduct], 
has increased rather than decreased competition overall within the credit-card industry.” Id. at 206. 
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V. OHIO V. AMERICAN EXPRESS 
Eleven of the plaintiff states filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme 
Court.62 The United States did not join in that effort and, to the contrary, 
expressed to the Court the view that the case was not a suitable vehicle for 
certiorari review because the conduct at issue was “idiosyncratic,” there was no 
conflict among the circuits, and the courts had had essentially no experience 
with the issues raised in the case.63 Also, there remained disagreements among 
economists regarding the implications of academic learning about platforms 
for antitrust issues.64 Nevertheless, the Court granted certiorari.65 
The issue in the case was whether the plaintiffs had carried their burden 
under the first step in the rule of reason of “proving that Amex’s antisteering 
provisions have an anticompetitive effect.”66 Because the case involved both sides 
of the two-sided market, it implicitly, but importantly, raised the question of how 
a court should decide a case of first impression under the antitrust laws. 
A. The Court’s Decision to Grant Certiorari 
Outsiders can only speculate about why the Court decided to issue the 
writ of certiorari and review the Second Circuit’s decision. As the United 
States had argued, the case presented none of the ordinary reasons for 
certiorari review. There was no conflict among the circuits. The issue 
regarding the lawfulness of the no-steering rules was not one of urgent 
national importance. And, one might surmise from the Court’s affirmance of 
the Second Circuit, the case did not even involve a mistake that the Court 
thought needed to be corrected. 
Moreover, it was a case of first impression that—as will be seen—involved 
new, difficult, and incomplete academic learning about both the underlying 
 
The court’s reasoning on this point was deeply flawed. The antitrust issue was whether the 
defendant’s conduct had made that growth less than it otherwise would have been or was likely to 
have that effect in the future. 
62 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16-1454), 
2017 WL 2472075. 
63 Brief for the United States in Opposition, Ohio v Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 
16-1454), 2017 WL 3485653. The United States subsequently filed a merits brief in support of 
petitioners. Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioners, Ohio v. Am. Express 
Co., 138 S. Ct. 227 (No. 16-1454), 2017 WL 6205804. 
64 For example, Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust Enforcement, 127 
YALE L.J. 2142 (2018), and JENS-UWE FRANCK & MARTIN PEITZ, CTR. ON REGULATION IN EUR., 
MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET POWER IN THE PLATFORM ECONOMY 26-27 (2019), conclude 
that it is more appropriate to define two, interrelated markets rather than a single, two-sided market, 
while Lapo Filistrucchi et al., Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
293, 302 (2014), recommend defining a single, two-sided market for transaction platforms. 
65 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017). 
66 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284. 
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economics and, more important, how to reflect the economic learning in legal 
doctrine.67 Although some earlier antitrust cases had involved credit card 
systems, none explicitly addressed the issues regarding two-sided platforms 
and transaction markets that were central to the American Express case.68 
On its face, therefore, the decision to review the case seems misguided. It 
suggests a lack of the kind of caution and humility that the common law of 
antitrust requires; and it invites speculation that at least some of the Justices 
saw the case as an opportunity to make new law to their liking, rather than to 
decide a specific case in furtherance of a healthy common law-like process. 
B. The Court’s Reformulation of the Rule of Reason 
This case was properly not regarded as a per se case, in part because it was 
one of first impression. The five-Justice majority (hereinafter, the Court) 
described the rule of reason as follows: 
1. The plaintiff bears the “initial burden to prove that the challenged 
restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect that harms consumers 
in the relevant market;”69 
2. “If the plaintiff carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the 
defendant to show a procompetitive rationale for the restraint;”70 and 
3. If the defendant meets its burden, then the “burden shifts back to the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that the procompetitive efficiencies could be 
reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.”71 
 
67 There has been research on transaction platforms at least since William F. Baxter, Bank 
Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 26 J.L. & ECON. 541 (1983). But 
substantial research on the subject did not begin until the late 1990s, and little was published before 
the early 2000s. The freshness of the research raises the question of how quickly courts should rely 
on new academic learning. One would expect the answer to depend at least in large part on the degree 
of consensus among economists, as well as on whether academic researchers have addressed questions 
the that courts care about and answered them in a form that courts can use. 
68 The closest was United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003), which 
involved rules of the Visa and MasterCard systems that permitted member banks of one system to 
serve as directors of the other but prohibited members from issuing competing American Express 
or Discover cards. Id. at 234. The Visa court found a credit card market and a separate network 
services market. Id. at 239 (“Whereas in the market for general purpose cards, the issuers are the 
sellers, and cardholders are the buyers, in the market for general purpose card network services, the 
four networks themselves are the sellers, and the issuers of cards and merchants are the buyers.”). 
The court did not address the concept of a transaction market, which as will be seen was central to 
the Court’s decision in American Express, or whether market definition or injury to competition 
might be affected by whether the business involved a two-sided platform. 
69 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. The Court said that “the parties agree that a three-step, burden-shifting framework 
applies” under the rule of reason, id.; but neither party embraced the particular formulation of the 
rule of reason set forth by the Court. See Brief for Petitioner and Respondents Nebraska, Tennessee, 
and Texas at 26-30, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 227 (No. 16-1454), 2017 WL 6205796; Brief 
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On the surface, the first two steps of the majority’s formulation are 
broadly consistent with the standard approach described in Part III above. 
On a closer look, however, there are important differences. 
Consider the first step. The American Express formulation requires that 
harm be shown in a “relevant market.” As we discuss below, this requirement 
reflects the Court’s view that formal market delineation is needed to analyze 
the competitive and consumer-welfare effects of the challenged conduct.72 
The standard formulation does not require proof of a relevant market. In fact, 
the Court acknowledged later in its opinion that direct proof of harm can 
suffice without market definition in cases involving horizontal restraints.73 It 
is not clear whether the Court intended to define a rule of reason for vertical 
restraints different from that used in all other antitrust cases or did not realize 
that its description of the rule of reason was inconsistent with both prior 
statements of the rule of reason and its own understanding of the law 
applicable to horizontal restraints. 
Read literally, the first two steps incorporate the standard and prudent 
practice of putting the burden on the plaintiff to prove harm and the burden on 
the defendant to prove procompetitive benefit. As will be seen, however, the 
Court applied the rule of reason in American Express by requiring the plaintiffs to 
prove net harm in a single market defined to include both sides of the platform: 
cardholders and merchants. It thus, in substance, required the plaintiffs to prove 
no offsetting benefit, instead of permitting the plaintiff to prove harm on one 
side and requiring the defendant to prove offsetting benefit on the other side. 
As to the second step, in contrast to the Microsoft court, the American Express 
Court did not provide guidance as to what is meant by a “procompetitive 
rationale.”74 As will be seen, its analysis of that issue was imprecise and flawed. 
Perhaps the most notable point in the Court’s formulation of the rule of 
reason is that it omits the fourth, balancing, step that is generally included in 
the formulation of the rule of reason.75 The three-step formulation described 
 
for Respondents American Express Company and American Express Travel Related Services 
Company, Inc. at 32-33, 41, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 227 (No. 16-1454), 2018 WL 481636. 
72 See infra Section V.C.1. 
73 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7 (“Given that horizontal restraints involve 
agreements between competitors not to compete in some way, this Court concluded that it did not need 
to precisely define the relevant market to conclude that these agreements were anticompetitive.”). 
74 Cf. United States vs. Microsoft Corp. 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per 
curiam) (defining a procompetitive justification as “a nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed 
a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced 
consumer appeal”). 
75 See, e.g., id. (“[I]f the monopolist’s procompetitive justification stands unrebutted, then the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the 
procompetitive benefit.”). Other lower court opinions have omitted the balancing step from their 
summaries of the rule of reason. See C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 
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by the Court seems to mean that the defendant wins if it can show “a 
procompetitive rationale” that cannot be achieved by less competitive means 
regardless of the magnitude of the procompetitive benefit relative to the 
magnitude of the harm to competition, and regardless whether the rationale 
motivated the conduct or was substantial enough to make the conduct 
profitable for the defendant absent its harmful effect on competition.76 If so, 
the formulation describes, without discussion or analysis, a new substantive 
rule of decision.77 
It is conceivable that the Court intended to incorporate balancing in the 
second step of the rule of reason by requiring that the defendant prove 
benefits sufficient to outweigh the harms proven by the plaintiff in the first 
step. Nothing in the Court’s discussion of the rule of reason or elsewhere in 
the opinion, however, supports this reading. To the contrary, the Court 
referred to showing a “procompetitive rationale,”78 a term that does not 
suggest any balancing of the benefit against the harm. 
The Court’s application of the rule of reason in this case to require the 
plaintiffs to prove a net price increase or output decrease might be thought to 
suggest that the Court did have balancing in mind and might even require the 
defendant to engage in similar balancing in step two. But the Court’s later 
discussion of American Express’s proffered procompetitive justification makes 
clear that net price and output effects do not exhaust the kinds of justifications 
that the Court thought might be cognizable and did not include any discussion 
of balancing the proffered justification against possible harms.79 
The Court purported to address in substance only the first step of the rule 
of reason.80 To the extent that it described a new rule of reason with respect 
to matters other than the first step, its opinion is dicta. But in describing new 
legal rules in dicta, and especially in doing so without reflecting on the ways 
they differed from past understandings and the reasons for doing so, the 
Court departed from good common law practice, in which legal rules are 
 
116 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 976-79 (2016). But the Court did not discuss those cases, purport to resolve 
a circuit conflict, or set forth any other reason for its omission. 
76 See also Carrier, supra note 31, at 53 (discussing how in American Express, “[t]he majority 
ignored balancing, even though that was an essential element of the rule of reason framework”). 
77 As noted, courts rarely reach the balancing stage in antitrust litigation. Arguably, therefore, the 
American Express Court’s formulation might simply reflect the reality of how courts apply the rule of 
reason. But nothing in the Court’s opinion suggests that that is what it had in mind, and an assessment 
of the real-world impact of the rule of reason would have to take into account cases that are settled in the 
shadow of the law, including the traditional balancing step, rather than litigated to judgment. 
78 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284. 
79 See infra Section V.C.4. 
80 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (“Here, the parties ask us to decide whether 
the plaintiffs have carried their initial burden of proving that Amex’s antisteering provisions have 
an anticompetitive effect.”). 
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induced from the facts and in which courts prescribe broad rules only on the 
basis of substantial judicial experience and learning. 
C. Specific Holdings 
In this Section, we examine four specific holdings in the case in which the 
Court applied the rule of reason as described by it. We explain how, even 
accepting the Court’s general formulation, the Court applied the rule of 
reason in way that undermined the common law process of antitrust law.81 It 
made important new law but did not address either the substantive or the 
institutional considerations that a court should address in resolving normative 
issues in a common law-like process. 
1. Vertical Restraints Must Be Assessed Within a Formally Defined 
Antitrust Market 
The Court held that antitrust challenges to vertical restraints must be 
assessed within the context of a formally defined antitrust market and that the 
plaintiff had the burden of defining and proving that market.82 The Court made 
new law by distinguishing a line of Supreme Court cases holding that harm to 
competition can be proven by direct evidence without proof of a relevant 
market.83 The Court reasoned that the earlier cases involved horizontal 
restraints and that vertical restraints “often pose no risk to competition.”84 On 
 
81 Both of us have criticized the American Express decision elsewhere, as a matter of substantive 
antitrust law, on several specific grounds. See Michael L. Katz, Platform Economics and Antitrust 
Enforcement: A Little Knowledge Is a Dangerous Thing, 28 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 138, 146 
(2019) [hereinafter Katz, Platform Economics] (criticizing the holdings in American Express that 
competition and consumer welfare can be harmed only if the conduct at issue raises the two-sided 
price or reduces output); Katz & Sallet, supra note 64, at 2150 (concluding that courts should use a 
multiple-markets approach—in which different groups of users on different sides of a platform belong 
in different product markets—rather than be required to use the single-market approach as held in 
American Express); A. Douglas Melamed, The American Express Case: Back to the Future, 18 COLO. 
TECH. L.J. 1, 19 (2020) (“The most problematic part of the Court’s decision was its approach to 
assessing competitive effects. The Court focused on the intrabrand vertical efficiency and gave short 
shrift to the anticompetitive interbrand effects that were the subject of the litigation.”); A. Douglas 
Melamed & Nicolas Petit, The Misguided Assault on the Consumer Welfare Standard in the Age of Platform 
Markets, 54 REV. INDUS. ORG. 741, 759 (2019) (discussing how the American Express majority 
“analyzed the issues too abstractly and formalistically and did not directly address important facts 
found by the district court or the material factual questions”); Michael L. Katz, Ohio v. American 
Express: Assessing the Threat to Antitrust Enforcement, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., June 2019 (finding 
that, because American Express offers a vague definition of transaction platform but makes the legal 
treatment of a defendant strongly dependent on whether it is a transaction platform, the opinion 
threatens to have adverse consequences, both intended and unintended, in a wide range of cases). 
82 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
2082 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 2061 
its face, that distinction is unsound because horizontal restraints, too, “often 
pose no risk to competition.”85 Moreover, the Court ignored economic learning 
that demonstrates that, like horizontal restraints, vertical restraints can harm 
competition when the firms involved possess significant market power.86 
In making new law in this way, the Court also departed from optimal 
common law process. In the first place, the Court should have focused on, but 
did not address, the substantive and institutional purposes of the earlier cases 
holding that a market need not be defined in all cases. Those cases rested on 
the notions that market definition is only an aid to assessing market power 
by indirect evidence, that proving relevant markets adds additional issues and 
complexity to antitrust litigation, and that direct evidence of harm to 
competition can in some cases be both more reliable than indirect inferences 
from market shares and far more economical for courts and litigants.87 
By approaching the issue in a formalistic way unconnected to the purpose 
of defining markets, the Court removed from the case an opportunity to 
assess the role of market definition in antitrust cases in a way that might 
enhance the evolution of sound antitrust doctrine.88 In particular, although 
the Court elsewhere emphasized that the two-sided nature of the platform is 
fundamental to the case and requires unusual analytical steps, it made no 
 
85 See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979)(noting that 
“[n]ot all arrangements among actual or potential competitors that have an impact on price are	.	.	. 
unreasonable restraints” and that horizontal mergers, joint ventures and other cooperative 
arrangements are “not usually unlawful”). 
86 Two recent papers are examples of such learning. See John Asker & Heski Bar-Isaac, Raising 
Retailers’ Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 672, 673 (2014) 
(exploring how a manufacturer can use vertical practices such as retail price maintenance and slotting 
allowances to deter entry even without entering into exclusive contracts with retailers); Giacomo 
Calzolari & Vincenzo Denicolò, Exclusive Contracts and Market Dominance, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 
3321, 3322 (2015) (showing that exclusive dealing contracts can be both profitable and 
anticompetitive). For a survey of modern economic theories of vertical restraints, see Patrick Rey & 
Thibaud Vergé, Economics of Vertical Restraints in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 353 
(Paolo Buccirossi, ed., 2008). 
87 E.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (“Since the purpose of 
the inquiries into market definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement has 
the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition, ‘proof of actual detrimental effects	.	.	.’ can 
obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a ‘surrogate for detrimental effects.’”) 
(citation omitted); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984) (“As a matter 
of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output.”); 
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[A] court must make ‘an enquiry 
meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details and logic of a restraint,’ which in some cases 
may not require a full-blown market analysis.”) (citation omitted). 
88 The Court emphasized the alleged importance of market definition, in part by citing 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992), for the proposition 
that “[l]egal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are 
generally disfavored in antitrust law.” Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285. Ironically, the 
Court’s insistence on a specific, bright-line market definition was, in fact, exactly what the quotation 
describes as disfavored. 
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effort to connect its requirement of proving a market to the fact that this case 
was about a two-sided platform. 
The Court failed to address the substantive issues in an appropriate 
common law-like way in other respects as well. For example, the Court did 
not address the question whether direct evidence might be a more reliable 
way to prove harm to competition than indirect proof obtained by defining a 
relevant market. The Court should have asked how defining a market would 
affect the accuracy of decisions whether the conduct at issue did or was likely 
to injure competition. 
The Court appeared to think that a market needs to be defined in order 
to determine whether the defendant has market power.89 But the two sources 
cited for that proposition state only that market power might be needed in 
order for competition to be injured; they make no mention of the need to 
define a market.90 The Court ignored long-standing economic learning that 
both market power and harm to competition often can be assessed without 
formally defining markets.91 As Justice Breyer explained in his dissent, proof 
of harm to competition makes separate proof of market power unnecessary.92 
American Express argued that its market share was so low that it could 
not have market power.93 This argument ignores both the fundamental nature 
of two-sided markets (e.g., that a user on one side of a platform industry may 
 
89 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7 (“Vertical restraints often pose no risk 
to competition unless the entity imposing them has market power, which cannot be evaluated unless 
the Court first defines the relevant market.”). 
90 See id. (quoting statements by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551 U.S. 877, 
898, that resale price maintenance “may not be a serious concern unless the relevant entity has market 
power” and Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 
160 (1984), that a vertical restraint can be anticompetitive “only if there is market power.”). 
91 See, e.g., Timothy F. Breshnahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, in 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1011, 1049 n. 44 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. 
Willig, eds., 1989) (surveying econometric techniques for estimating market power, none of which 
relies on market definition); Jonathan Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 131 (2007) (“But market definition may not be required when market power 
or anticompetitive effect can be demonstrated directly through means other than inference from the 
number, size distribution, and other characteristics of firms.”). 
92 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2296-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Doubts about 
the District Court’s market definition analysis are beside the point in the face of the District Court’s 
findings of actual anticompetitive harm.”). This is, of course, not a novel observation. For example, 
see FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61 (1986). 
This point has been recognized specifically for credit card networks. See United States v. Visa 
U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir. 2003) (“In short, Visa U.S.A. and MasterCard have 
demonstrated their power in the network services market by effectively precluding their largest 
competitor from successfully soliciting any bank as a customer for its network services and brand.”); see 
also Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case, 2019 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 35, 47 (stating that anticompetitive effects could be shown directly by “proof of actual 
detrimental effects on competition”) (quoting Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284). 
93 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 189 n.23 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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be entirely dependent on a specific platform to reach certain users on the 
other side) and the effects of product differentiation, both of which can 
enable the exercise of market power even by platforms with modest market 
shares. More important, even if market shares might be relevant to American 
Express’s defense, there was no reason to require the plaintiff to define and prove 
a market in all cases involving vertical restraints without considering how 
such a requirement would further the purposes of the rule of reason or enable 
its evolution in the light of new learning and commercial practices, such as 
those at issue in American Express. 
Finally, the Court completely ignored the institutional issues. It did not ask 
how requiring proof of a relevant market would affect complexity in antitrust 
cases, litigation burdens for the parties and the courts, or the predictability of 
antitrust law. Where there is sufficient direct evidence of harm to competition, 
requiring proof of a relevant market in addition to the direct evidence 
necessarily increases complexity and litigation burdens. And by creating an 
additional element that the plaintiff must prove, the requirement also tends to 
bias outcomes in favor of defendants. Specifically, a plaintiff might lose a case 
because it fails to satisfy its burden with respect to relevant markets even in 
circumstance in which direct evidence alone is sufficient to establish harm to 
competition and market definition is superfluous. 
2. The Conduct of a Transaction Platform Must Be Examined in a Single 
Market Encompassing Both Sides of the Platform 
The Court held that the competitive effects of conduct by a “transaction 
platform”—which the Court found American Express to be—must be assessed 
within the context of a single, two-sided antitrust market.94 In the Court’s 
view, the defining feature of a transaction platform is that it facilitates direct 
transactions between users on its different sides and “cannot make a sale to 
one side of the platform without simultaneously making a sale to the other.”95 
Thus, the Court asserted, transaction platforms are better understood as 
“‘suppl[ying] only one product’—transactions.”96 
The idea that the distinctive feature of transaction platforms is that they 
provide a single product—transactions—seems to be at the core of Court’s 
analysis of market definition and, as will be seen, injury to competition and 
 
94 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287. 
95 Id. at 2280. 
96 Id. at 2286 (citation omitted). Elsewhere, the Court described a transaction platform as “a 
special type of two-sided platform” and said that, “[a]s the name implies, a two-sided platform offers 
different products or services to two different groups who both depend on the platform to 
intermediate between them.” Id. at 2280 (emphasis added). 
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procompetitive justifications. It might also be a source of what, as will be 
explained, appear to be serious mistakes in the Court’s analysis. 
As discussed above, there were no controlling precedents regarding 
market definition in cases involving two-sided transaction platforms. 
Although there had been earlier two-sided market cases that involved cross-
platform feedback effects and transaction platforms, those cases predated the 
development of modern platform economics and did not focus on how to 
account for the possibility that the challenged conduct has opposing effects 
on the welfare of users on different sides of the platform.97 
In such circumstances, sound, common law-like adjudication requires 
proceeding cautiously, with careful attention to the facts of the case and the 
lack of judicial experience and learning. The Court might, for example, have 
made a very fact- and case-specific ruling, and it might even have suggested 
that whether the market should include one or both sides of the platform 
should be decided on a case-by-case basis. A ruling of that type would have 
enabled the law to evolve in the light of judicial experience and would have 
respected the new and unsettled nature of economic learning about 
platforms.98 Alternatively, the Court might have established a rebuttable 
presumption that the market should include both sides and thus left open the 
possibility that subsequent experience would teach whether a more 
unequivocal rule would be prudent. 
Instead, the Court adopted a sweeping legal rule and based that rule on 
its highly imperfect understanding of the economic literature. The reliance 
on academic learning should have provided an even greater reason for 
humility and caution, both because the Justices are not economic experts and 
because economists were—and are—divided on the question of whether a 
single market should be defined for both sides of a transaction platform.99 
 
97 For example, cross-platform network effects were central issues in both Microsoft and Visa 
U.S.A.: “[I]n the market for general purpose card network service, the four networks themselves are 
the sellers and the issuers of cards and merchants are the buyers.” Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d at 239. 
98 In a case addressing very different issues, Justice Gorsuch dissented from a passage in the 
Court’s majority opinion on the ground that, while the passage was correct, it could be read to 
suggest that only specific factual circumstances “are governed by the legal rules recounted in and 
faithfully applied by the Court’s opinion. Such a reading would be unreasonable for our cases are 
‘governed by general principles, rather than ad hoc improvisations.’” Trinity Lutheran Church v. 
Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2026 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. 
v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 25 (2004)). Whatever the wisdom of that observation in the matters of First 
Amendment law at issue in that case, sound antitrust adjudication requires more attention to facts 
and more caution before embedding in legal rules economically-based—and therefore contingent 
and often impermanent—“general principles.” 
99 The Court cited Filistrucchi et al., supra note 64, which argued that a single, two-sided 
market should be defined. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287. The Court also cited Evans 
and Noel, who argued for the need to consider effects on both sides of a platform. Id. (quoting David 
S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate Two-Sided Platforms, 2005 
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Although it was appropriate to rely in part on academic learning, especially 
given the lack of other relevant learning, a common law approach to the issues 
would have counseled conducting a broad review of the relevant literature, 
noting any areas of disagreement, and deciding the case narrowly while 
deferring—until the accumulation of more judicial experience and learning—
the prescribing of broad legal rules to govern future cases. 
Had the Court applied the rule of reason in a way well-suited for the 
common law evolution of antitrust law, it would have proceeded differently 
in other ways as well. It would have asked whether including both sides in a 
single market would make sense as a legal rule, addressing both institutional 
and substantive considerations. 
With respect to the institutional considerations that should have informed 
its decision, the Court should have asked whether its new legal rule would 
reduce or increase the administrative burden on parties and courts, and 
 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667, 671 (2005), which noted that “[f]ocusing on	.	.	. one dimension of 
competition tends to distort the competition that actually exists among [two-sided platforms]” 
(alterations and omissions in original)). But, as the cited passage itself makes clear, Evans and Noel 
did not say that the courts should always define a single, two-sided market. To the contrary, they 
stated the opposite elsewhere in the cited article. See Evans & Noel, supra, at 697 (stating that courts 
should implement “a looser form of market definition: one that is less insistent on defining sharp 
boundaries and that considers the degree of constraints” and cautioning that “industries with [two-
sided platforms] are sufficiently complex that mechanical market definition exercises are particularly 
likely to obscure market realities”). 
The Court ignored one of the foundational articles in the two-sided platform literature, which 
stated that, for transaction-platform industries in which users multi-home on one side and single-
home on the other, “it does not make sense to speak of the competitiveness of ‘the market.’ There are 
two markets: the market for single-homing agents which is, to a greater or lesser extent, competitive, 
and a market for multi-homing agents where each platform holds a local monopoly.” Mark Armstrong, 
Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668, 680 (2006). Although users on both sides 
of credit card platforms multi-home, there is a much a greater degree of multi-homing by merchants. 
Moreover, as discussed infra note 110, card users make choices transaction-by-transaction, while 
merchants either accept all of a network’s transactions or none. Both of these sources of asymmetry 
support Armstrong’s point that the degree of competition for users can be very different on the two 
sides of a platform, and these differences are obscured by defining a single, two-sided market. 
Based in part on Armstrong’s analysis, Wismer et al. concluded that defining a transaction 
platform as operating in a single, two-sided market is “feasible only if	.	.	. substitutability of the 
service from the perspective of each customer group does not differ substantially.” Sebastian Wismer 
et al., Multi-Sided Market Economics in Competition Law Enforcement, 8 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & 
PRAC. 257, 260, 260 n. 15 (2017). 
For recent discussions of reasons why even a transaction platform is better viewed as operating 
in multiple separate, yet deeply interrelated, markets, see FRANCK & PEITZ, supra note 64, at 26, 
which stated that “adopting the single-market approach may lead to neglecting close substitute offers 
on one side of the market, which merely shows that there is not a single market since substitutable 
product offerings are very different for the two sides” (emphasis omitted) and Katz & Sallet, supra 
note 64, at 2158, which stated that “the single-market approach fails to accurately account for product 
substitution and competitive conditions in multisided platform industries. Such a reality lends strong 
weight to the conclusion that a more fine-grained analytical framework, namely the multiple-markets 
approach, is necessary.” 
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whether it would make antitrust decisions more predictable. As to the former, 
including both sides of a transaction platform in a single market greatly 
complicates defining and proving the relevant market and thus increases the 
litigation burdens for both the parties and the courts. 
Market definition focuses on demand substitution—on identifying the 
alternative sellers that constrain the defendant’s behavior.100 For many multi-
sided platforms, however, the competitive alternatives are not the same on 
the different sides.101 That is true, with less frequency, even for transaction 
platforms.102 For example, Uber would seem to fit the Court’s definition of a 
“transaction platform” because Uber is in the business of matching drivers 
and riders.103 The alternatives on the two sides are, however, not the same.104 
Riders’ alternatives are different forms of transportation, such as Lyft, taxis, 
car sharing services such as Zipcar, public transportation, bikes, scooters, and 
walking. Drivers’ alternatives are other occupations, including driving for 
Lyft or other ride-hailing platforms, working for food-delivery services, or 
possibly unskilled jobs that do not involve driving.105 Whether all of the 
alternatives should be included in the same antitrust market is an empirical 
question that cannot be answered by determining whether the alternatives are 
 
100 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES §	4 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-
review/100819hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ3T-3X4A] [hereinafter 2010 HMG] (“Market 
definition focuses solely on demand substitution factors	.	.	.	.”). 
101 Obvious examples include newspapers and advertiser-supported television and radio news 
broadcasters. The alternatives to an advertiser are other forms of advertising, including advertising 
on entertainment media, billboards, and direct mail. None of those is a suitable alternative to 
consumers looking for news content. 
102 In addition to the example of Uber considered here, see the discussion of competition 
between Sabre and Farelogix infra Part VI. 
103 See Joshua D. Wright & John M. Yun, Ohio v. American Express: Implications for Non-
Transaction Multisided Platforms, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., June 2019, at 6 (“Uber is a transaction 
platform that competes with non-platforms, to one degree or another, including taxis, subways, and 
buses—as well as other platforms such as Lyft.”). 
104 Because the alternatives are different, defining a single, two-sided market risks overlooking 
some of the alternatives—especially those that are not themselves transaction platforms or do not 
constrain the platform on both sides—and thus defining the market too narrowly. 
105 Evans and Schmalensee argue that a single market encompassing both sides should be 
defined for any platform that sells a single service that is “jointly consumed.” DAVID S. EVANS & 
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF PLATFORM MARKETS: WHY THE SUPREME 
COURT GOT IT RIGHT IN AMERICAN EXPRESS 63 (2019). Understanding that the transportation and 
occupation alternatives on the two sides of the Uber platform differ illustrates a major flaw in their 
argument. Even when a platform’s service is jointly consumed—when provided by that platform—it 
does not follow that all of the competitive alternatives available to users on the two sides of the 
platform themselves involve joint consumption by the same two sets of users. 
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properly characterized as “platforms” or even “transaction platforms.” The 
Court appears not to have focused on these commercial realities.106 
Including both sides of the platform in a single market would thus require 
determining which combinations of possibly very different competitive 
alternatives on the two sides, including alternatives on one side that are not 
meaningful alternatives to buyers on the other side, would constitute a 
market.107 That complicated exercise would often be unnecessary. Consider, 
for example, a case alleging the exclusion of a rival on one side of the 
platform. A court might be able to assess the impact of that exclusion by 
considering the market on only that side of the platform and assessing 
feedback effects to and from the other side, without the complex task of 
identifying the sellers on the other side that should be included in the market. 
In addition to increasing administrative costs, requiring proof of a 
single, two-sided market for transaction platforms almost surely reduces the 
predictability of antitrust decisions because of the added complexity and, as 
discussed below, the diminished accuracy in a wide range of cases. 
With respect to the substantive considerations, the Court should have 
asked whether its new legal rule will, as a practical matter, increase the 
accuracy of antitrust decisions. The Court did not ask that, and it is entirely 
possible that the new rule will decrease decision accuracy. 
First, it is difficult to see how defining a single market could enhance 
judicial accuracy. To be sure, economists agree that feedback effects between 
the two sides should be taken into account when they are significant.108 But 
it is not necessary to define a single market to assess those effects. Feedback 
effects can be examined directly by determining, for example, how increased 
cardholder benefits might affect cardholder purchasing behavior and thus 
 
106 The Court asserted that “[o]nly other two-sided platforms can compete with a two-sided 
platform for transactions.” Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018). It is not clear what 
the Court meant by that statement. If the term “transactions” is intended to refer only to transactions 
on two-sided platforms, the statement would be tautological and irrelevant to antitrust analysis. It is 
conceivable that the statement is intended to limit, as a matter of law, the definition of a transaction 
platform to those platforms that compete only with other platforms; but the Court neither said that 
nor set forth any explanation of why that would make sense as a legal rule. If—as seems likely from 
the context of the statement within the opinion—the statement is intended to mean that two-sided 
platforms do not, in fact, compete with suppliers that are not platforms, then as explained above the 
statement is incorrect, even with respect to transactions offered on the platforms. As will be seen, the 
ambiguity in this statement has already led at least one district court astray. See infra Part VI. 
107 Alternatively, the court could make a threshold determination as to whether the platform was 
suitable for defining a single market. But that would require the court to determine whether the 
alternatives and products are the same on both sides—in effect to define a market on each side—in 
order to determine whether it could sensibly define a single market that encompasses both sides. 
108 Although economists agree that feedback effects should be taken into account where they 
are significant, economists do not agree on whether both sides should be included in a single market. 
See, e.g., EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 105; FRANCK & PEITZ, supra note 64; Filistruchi et 
al., supra note 64; Katz & Sallet, supra note 64. 
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merchants, or how increased merchant fees might reduce the number of 
merchants accepting Amex cards and thus harm cardholders. Antitrust law 
often takes into account effects that are outside the relevant market.109 
Not only is including both sides in a single market unnecessary to assessing 
feedback effects, but there are reasons to think that requiring definition of a 
single two-sided market for transaction platforms will reduce judicial accuracy. 
For one thing, the added complexity of defining the market could increase the 
likelihood of error. So, too, could the additional issue created by the Court’s 
decision—whether the business at issue is properly regarded as a “transaction 
platform.” The Court did not offer a precise definition of what constitutes a 
transaction platform. In fact, it is not even clear that American Express meets 
the definition of a transaction market, both because it derives substantial 
revenues from both annual card fees and the issuance of credit rather than 
direct transaction fees, and because it sells merchants “acceptance services” 
rather than individual transactions.110 Given the importance the Court 
attaches to being labeled a transaction platform, it is no surprise that whether 
a defendant is a transaction platform has already become a matter of 
contention in several litigations.111 
 
109 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics 21 (Univ. Pa. Law Sch. 
Inst. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 20-15, 2020) (“In sum, antitrust has been dealing with effects 
that occur outside the boundaries of a defined relevant market for a long time and addressing such 
questions is hardly exceptionsl [sic].”). 
Evans and Schmalensee have recently defended the American Express decision based on their 
understanding of the rule of reason. EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 105, at 27. They argue that 
defining a market on one side “means, as a practical matter, the court	[is] ignoring pro-competitive 
benefits” on the other side. This argument overlooks the fact that feedback effects generated by changes 
in benefits and costs for users on one side of a platform certainly can and should be taken into account 
if they affect competition in a relevant market defined on the other side. Their argument also overlooks 
the fact that the district court in American Express did look at the claimed benefits on the cardholder 
side and rejected them as a matter of fact. See infra Section V.C.4. 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines make clear that the federal antitrust agencies will take 
efficiency benefits into account, even if they do not affect the defined relevant market, so long as they 
are “inextricably linked” to the harms in the affected market. See 2010 HMG, supra note 97, at §	10 n.14 
(“Inextricably linked efficiencies are most likely to make a difference when they are great and the likely 
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market(s) is small so the merger is likely to benefit customers 
overall.”). If the benefits are not inextricably linked, they can by definition be achieved without the 
harm to the relevant market and therefore ought not be used to justify those harms. 
In any event, Evans and Schmalensee’s argument begs the question of whether the best way to 
take account of effects on the other side of the platform is to define a two-sided market or to ensure 
that those effects are taken into account even if they do not occur in the relevant market. Evans and 
Schmalensee do not address that question. 
110 That is, instead of purchasing individual card transactions from American Express, merchants 
purchase the right (and the obligation) to hold themselves out to the public as accepting any valid 
American Express card presented to them. Similarly, cardholders buy a bundle of rights, including the 
right to select American Express transactions at Amex-accepting merchants, as well as benefits such as 
airline lounge access. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 160-64 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
111 See infra Part VI. 
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In addition, defining a single, two-sided market might reduce the accuracy 
of judicial decisions by making market definition less useful as an aid to the 
ultimate decision. Markets are often defined in antitrust cases because doing 
so allows the calculation of the market shares of the competing sellers, which 
are then used as proxies for the degree of market power. There are, however, 
often significant differences between the competitive conditions on the 
two sides of a transaction platform attributable to differences in the 
availability of substitutes, product differentiation, vertical integration, 
user sophistication, and user multihoming. Because a single share based 
on a market that encompasses both sides of a platform cannot possibly 
capture these differences in competitive conditions on the two sides, 
defining a single market encompassing both sides reduces the usefulness 
of market-share information and thus of market definition. 
3. In Order to Prove Harm to Competition Directly, Plaintiffs Must Prove 
That the Challenged Conduct Increased the Two-sided Price Above the 
Competitive Level or Reduced Output in the Market 
The district court found that the no-steering provisions injured 
competition on the basis of direct evidence showing that the provisions:  
reduced competition among card systems; thwarted rivals—particularly, 
Discover—from competing against American Express’s high-price/high-
benefits business model with a low-price, high-benefits model; and resulted 
in increased merchant fees that were not offset by increased cardholder 
benefits.112 These findings were sufficient to establish harm to competition as 
an economic and factual matter. 
The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the facts found by the 
district court were insufficient to show harm to competition.113 This was a 
substantive mistake. Indeed, the Court seemed to have a fundamental 
misunderstanding about the meaning of harm to competition. The Court 
emphasized that the “antisteering provisions do not prevent Visa, 
MasterCard, or Discover from competing against Amex by offering lower 
merchant fees or promoting their broader merchant acceptance.”114 But the 
issue is not whether the rules “prevent” competitors from reducing price or 
even whether the rules directly restrain competitors. It is enough that the 
rules cause materially less price competition by reducing the incentives of 
competitors to reduce price. The district court found that the rules not only 
reduced that incentive but specifically deterred Discover from pursuing a 
 
112 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 195-96, 212-17. 
113 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287-90 (2018) (“The plaintiffs have not 
carried their burden to prove anticompetitive effects in the relevant market.”). 
114 Id. at 2290. 
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low-merchant-price, high-cardholder-benefits strategy because the rules 
prohibited merchants from passing on the lower fees to cardholders and 
thereby prevented Discover and other card networks from using reduced 
merchant fees to generate increased card usage.115 The Supreme Court 
identified no evidence to contradict this finding. 
The Court compounded that mistake by departing from what a good 
common law antitrust court would have done if it had concluded that the facts 
were insufficient to show harm to competition. That court would have 
proceeded humbly and with caution, being mindful of the novelty and 
difficulty of the issues and of the lack of judicial experience in dealing with 
them. It might have affirmed on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to 
prove harm to competition. It might have remanded to give the lower courts 
the opportunity to explore issues addressed in the record but not in the 
district court findings. It might have acknowledged that it had little basis to 
prescribe the kinds of rules that are appropriate for a common law court only 
after substantial judicial experience. In support of this disposition, it could 
have cited its many prior decisions that have made clear that per se rules—
which generally aid plaintiffs—are appropriate only after the court can 
confidently determine that such a rule is appropriate on the basis of well-
founded knowledge.116 
Instead, the Court went further and, in effect, set forth a requirement for 
proof of injury to competition among two-sided transaction platforms. 
Specifically, the Court held that “plaintiffs must” prove that prices of credit 
card transactions were elevated above the competitive level, that the number 
of such transactions was reduced, or that the no-steering rules “otherwise 
stifled competition in the credit card market.”117 Notably, the Court cited in 
 
115 The court said that, 
the failure of Discover’s low-price value proposition is emblematic of the harm done to the 
competitive process by Amex’s rules against merchant steering. Since customers can neither 
independently access nor account for the costs of different forms of payment when deciding 
which to use, a lowest-cost provider strategy cannot succeed in the network services market 
if merchants are unable to shift share among the various networks. 
United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp 3d at 214 (footnote omitted). 
116 See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (“We do not know 
enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain.”); 
see also Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977) (“The Court’s refusal to endorse 
a per se rule in White Motor Co. was based on its uncertainty as to whether vertical restrictions satisfied 
those standards.”); United States vs. Microsoft Corp. 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per 
curiam) (“We hold that the rule of reason, rather than per se analysis, should govern the legality of 
tying arrangements involving platform software products.	.	.	. There being no close parallel in prior 
antitrust cases, simplistic application of per se tying rules carries a serious risk of harm.”). 
117 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287. The “otherwise stifled competition” notion 
appears to have been something of a throw-away line. The Court neither discussed what that meant 
nor explained why the facts found by the district court, such as the manifest reduction of competition 
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support of this proposition a predatory pricing case that did not involve a two-
sided platform.118 It is perhaps not surprising then that, as we will now 
explain, the Court’s tests for injury to competition are substantively wrong, 
as well as poorly suited from an institutional perspective, when applied to 
transaction platforms such as America Express. 
a. The Court’s Two-Sided Price Test 
The Court held that harm to competition could be inferred based on prices 
if and only if the plaintiffs proved that the defendant’s conduct elevated the 
platform’s two-sided price (i.e., the sum of the prices it charges to the two sides 
for a transaction) above the competitive level.119 In the Court’s view, if a 
transaction platform sells a single product—transaction facilitation—that is 
jointly purchased by consumers and merchants, then there is only a single price 
to consider. The Court appeared to believe that this implies that changes in 
consumer welfare can be assessed by the change in a single, two-sided price.120 
This holding is incorrect as a substantive matter. Although it claimed to be 
applying modern platform economics, the Court in fact ignored one of the 
fundamental findings of that work: because users on different sides of a 
platform generally have divergent interests, the consumer welfare and 
efficiency effects of a platform’s conduct cannot be understood solely by 
examining the effects of that conduct on the two-sided price—it is critical to 
 
with respect to merchant fees and the impact of the no-steering rules on the low-fee business models, 
such as Discover’s, failed to establish that the rules “stifled competition.” 
118 Id. at 2288 (holding that harm to competition will not be inferred from price and output 
data absent evidence that “output was restricted or prices were above a competitive level.”) (quoting 
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 237 (1993)). 
119 The court said that, 
Evidence of a price increase on one side of a two-sided transaction platform cannot 
by itself demonstrate an anticompetitive exercise of market power. To demonstrate 
anticompetitive effects on the two-sided credit-card market as a whole, the plaintiffs 
must prove that Amex’s antisteering provisions increased the cost [i.e., two-sided 
price] of credit-card transactions above a competitive level, reduced the number of 
credit-card transactions, or otherwise stifled competition in the credit-card market. 
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287. 
Because the relation between the actual price and the competitive price does not depend on the 
boundaries of the market, the Court’s holding that proof of elevated prices would suffice to show harm to 
competition demonstrates that there is no need to define a market in all cases involving vertical restraints. 
120 As noted above, the Court did not spell out what a defendant must show in the second step of 
the rule of reason to meet its burden of establishing a procompetitive justification. See text accompanying 
note 71. Presumably, however, in order to be cognizable, a proffered procompetitive justification would 
have to provide a net benefit after taking into account both sides of the platform. It would be senseless 
to permit a defendant to justify harms on both sides by showing beneficial effects on one side that might 
be much less or even harmful overall when both sides are taken into account. 
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examine the individual prices charged to the different sides.121 Indeed, the 
need to examine the individual prices charged to users on the different sides 
of the platform rather than solely the two-sided price has been identified as 
the defining feature of a transaction platform by one of the seminal papers 
on the subject, authored by a Nobel laureate and cited (but in this regard, 
ignored) by the Court.122 
Although some have likened treating consumer and merchant payment 
services as a single product to treating pairs of left shoes and right shoes as a 
single product, there is a critical difference.123 A payment transaction is 
purchased by two distinct parties—a consumer and a merchant—who have 
distinct and non-congruent interests. By contrast, a left shoe and a right shoe 
are bought in a pair by the same person. 
A shoe buyer cares only about the total price paid for the pair; it is a matter 
of indifference if the right shoe notionally costs more or less than the left shoe. 
In the terminology of the academic literature, a shoe buyer cares only about 
the price level, not the price structure. By contrast, credit card users and 
merchants care very much about the component prices, not just the two-sided 
price. With the no-steering rules in effect, consumers make card-use decisions 
in large part based on cardholder rewards without regard to the fees charged 
to merchants. And merchants’ economic welfare depends primarily on the fees 
that they are charged, not the two-sided price. 
For a shoe buyer, a $1 increase in the price of left shoes coupled with a $1 
decrease in the price of right shoes would almost certainly have no effect on the 
buyer’s choice of how many pairs of shoes to buy or on his or her welfare. But a 
$1 increase in Amex’s credit-card rewards (the equivalent of a $1 price reduction 
to cardholders) coupled with a $1 increase in merchant fees can matter in several 
ways. For example, card-holders might benefit from the increased rewards, and 
the transaction volume on American Express cards could rise as consumers 
choose to use those cards more frequently. The change in price structure could, 
however, reduce the economic welfare of users on one or both sides of the 
platform even though the price level remains constant. 
If the set of merchants accepting credit cards stays the same, then 
consumers will be better off, but merchants may well be worse off due to the 
 
121 The Court’s confusion may be a consequence of the majority’s insistence that a transaction 
platform offers only a single product. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286 n.8 (“[C]redit 
card companies are best understood as supplying only one product—transactions—which is jointly 
consumed by a cardholder and a merchant.”). If the Court had recognized two closely interrelated, 
but distinct markets, it would have been forced to consider the different prices to the two sides and, 
thus, might have taken a more complete view of competition. 
122 See id. at 2281 (citing Rochet & Tirole, supra note 13). 
123 See, e.g., EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 105, at 33 (making this argument in the 
context of market definition and missing the critical distinction described in the text). 
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increase in the fees they are required to pay. In principle, merchants might 
benefit from additional consumer purchases stimulated by the increase in 
consumer rewards. But any such gains must be weighed against the increase in 
fees paid by merchants for transactions that would have occurred using 
American Express even if the price structure had been left unchanged. 
Moreover, it is plausible that some of the additional American Express 
transactions induced by the increased rewards are for purchases that the 
consumer otherwise would have made using alternative payment methods 
equally or less costly to merchants. The change in the price structure could thus 
increase the merchant’s fees while generating little increase in merchant sales 
and might, on balance, harm merchants. Notably, even though the two-sided 
price remains constant, the losses (which economists call reduced surplus) 
suffered by merchants might outweigh the gains (increased surplus) enjoyed by 
consumers from the increased rewards.124 In fact, the overall effect on consumer 
and merchant welfare might be negative even when the two-sided price falls.125 
Moreover, if some merchants stop accepting American Express cards and 
their acceptance was sufficiently valued by cardholders, then cardholders 
could be worse off from the reduced ability to use their cards even though the 
rewards rate has increased and the two-sided price has remained constant or 
even fallen. Because a lower two-sided price can correspond to lower welfare 
for both merchants and users, the Court’s price test lacks a sound basis in 
economics.126 
The Court’s treatment of price effects also failed to take account of the 
institutional factors it should have considered. The Court insisted on evidence 
that the two-sided price was above the competitive level.127 However, 
calculating the competitive two-sided price from first principles (i.e., based 
on cost and demand conditions) is unlikely to be feasible given the factual 
record of most cases and the current state of platform economics. In principle, 
 
124 This possibility arises when the increase in rewards leads consumers to choose American 
Express for transactions that would have generated higher joint benefits using different payment 
methods. In the absence of no-steering rules, the merchants would have been able to share those 
benefits with consumers (such as by charging lower retail prices when the alternatives are used) to 
induce consumers to make different payment choices. If the benefits a merchant offers a consumer 
for using a different payment method exceed the value of the additional American Express rewards 
to the consumer, then the consumer will choose the alternative method, and both the consumer and 
the merchant will be better off. 
125 For an algebraic example demonstrating that aggregate user surplus may be lower when a 
transaction platform lowers its two-sided price, see Katz, Platform Economics, supra note 81, at 145. 
126 We are not saying that the change in the two-sided price could never be informative 
regarding changes in user welfare. Instead, we are making the point that economists and courts do 
not yet know the set of conditions under which looking solely at the two-sided price is sufficient, and 
therefore the Court erred in promulgating a sweeping rule. 
127 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2287 (2018) (“[P]laintiffs must prove that Amex’s 
antisteering provisions increased the cost of credit-card transactions above a competitive level	.	.	.	.”). 
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one might rely on the price that prevailed prior to the challenged conduct as 
a benchmark, but the plaintiffs challenged no-steering provisions that 
American Express (and, previously, other credit card networks) had insisted 
upon for decades. Therefore, on the plaintiffs’ theory, there was no 
competitive market to observe as a benchmark. 
The district court found as a factual matter that the no-steering provisions 
directly harmed the competitive process and led to higher merchant fees that 
were not fully offset by increases in cardholder benefits, thus raising the two-
sided price.128 The Supreme Court failed to recognize that these findings, in 
the absence of evidence that the initial prices were below competitive levels, 
also demonstrated that American Express was able to charge supracompetitive 
prices.129 In ignoring this evidence, the Court seemed to require direct proof 
of the competitive price as a benchmark and thus to require proof of something 
that could not have been proven in the American Express case—not because it 
might not have been true, but for evidentiary and procedural reasons. 
b. The Court’s Output Test 
The Court held that evidence showing merchant fee increases without fully 
offsetting cardholder reward increases did not demonstrate that prices were 
above competitive levels or even that plaintiffs had sufficient market power to 
increase prices profitably; as noted above, the Court reasoned that “rising prices 
are equally consistent with growing product demand” absent evidence that 
output is falling and that “[m]arket power is the ability to raise price profitably 
by restricting output.”130 In effect, therefore, the Court held that, at least absent 
direct proof of the often unobservable competitive price, proof of harm to 
competition requires proof of reduced output. As Justice Breyer put it in his 
 
128 The court found that 
Plaintiffs have established, for instance, that American Express’s prohibitions on merchant 
steering aided the network’s efforts to profitably raise its discount rates on merchants 
accounting for 65% of the network’s annual U.S. charge volume as part of its Value 
Recapture initiatives in the late 2000s.	.	.	. Plaintiffs have provided sufficient circumstantial 
evidence and expert testimony for the court to conclude that Amex’s Value Recapture price 
increases were not wholly offset by additional rewards expenditures or otherwise passed 
through to cardholders, and resulted in a higher net price. 
United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citations omitted). 
Notably, American Express’s market power enabled it to increase prices to merchants while 
causing only a very few large and medium-sized merchants to cease accepting Amex cards. Id. at 197. 
129 The Court did suggest that the price increase might have reflected increased demand for 
credit card services rather than market power, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288, but it 
made no effort to connect that speculation to the facts in the case. 
130 Id. (citations omitted). 
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dissent, “the majority retreats to saying that even [two-sided] price increases do 
not matter after all, absent a showing of lower output.”131 
The Court did not explain the rationale for focusing on output. The Court 
cited only authorities that concerned traditional, non-platform markets. The 
Court might have assumed that, if transaction platforms sell only a single 
product—transactions—then the welfare effects of output increases or 
decreases must be the same as the effects of changes in the output of other 
products, even if sold by firms that are not two-sided platforms. Whatever 
the explanation, the Court appeared not to recognize that the relationship 
between output and consumer welfare can be very different in transaction-
platform markets from that in other markets.132 
As a substantive matter, platform output is not a good test of economic 
welfare or of whether competition has been increased or decreased. Like the 
Court’s two-sided price test, the Court’s output test is flawed because it fails 
to account for the fact that consumers and merchants have distinct economic 
interests. In a one-sided market, an increase in output, holding quality 
constant, typically corresponds to an improvement in consumer welfare, at 
least absent price discrimination. Intuitively, a consumer will buy more only 
if the supplier makes additional purchases more attractive. But in a two-sided 
market, changes in transaction volumes and changes in user welfare can 
diverge because the interests of the users on the two sides are not aligned, and 
a platform may be able to exploit this fact to increase its profits in ways that 
increase output but harm competition and the platform’s users.133 
The no-steering rules—which prevent merchants from taking actions to 
align consumers’ and merchants’ interests—are one way for a platform to do 
that.134 American Express’s merchant contracts require a participating 
merchant to accept any request by a consumer to use an American Express card 
to pay even if the merchant would be better off not accepting an American 
Express card for that particular transaction. And the no-steering rules prevent 
the merchant from doing anything to influence the cardholder’s decision. If the 
cost of an additional American Express transaction to the merchant exceeds the 
 
131 Id. at 2302 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
132 Evans and Schmalensee also assert that a court applying the rule of reason should focus, 
“ultimately, on the overall output of the jointly consumed service”. EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra 
note 105, at 40 & n.81 (arguing that increased output is “a central virtue of competition” and its loss 
is one of the “standard signals of competitive harm”). 
133 For a technical demonstration, see Katz, Platform Economics, supra note 81, at 146-148. 
134 Both Edelman and Wright and Schwartz and Vincent have shown that this type of restraint 
can lead to excessive use of the platform. See generally Benjamin Edelman & Julian Wright, Price 
Coherence and Excessive Intermediation, 130 Q.J. ECON 1283 (2015); Marius Schwartz & Daniel R. 
Vincent, The No Surcharge Rule and Card User Rebates: Vertical Control By a Payment Network, 5 REV. 
NETWORK ECON. 72 (2006). 
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gain to the cardholder, then overall user welfare is reduced even if the number 
of such transactions increases. 
As Edelman and Wright have explained, there are three related mechanisms 
through which policies such as no-steering rules can harm competition and users 
while promoting overconsumption of the transaction service.135 First, under the 
no-steering rules, every one of a merchant’s customers pays higher retail prices 
as the merchant passes on some or all of the fees that American Express charges 
it, and the amount of the pass through to any given customer is the same whether 
or not that customer uses American Express to facilitate the purchase 
transaction.136 This passing-on effect is tantamount to a “tax” on those customers 
who do not use American Express, which defrays some of the costs the merchant 
incurs serving customers who do use American Express.137 Because an Amex 
cardholder does not incur an additional cost for using the platform, he or she 
will tend to use it even if the actual costs associated with the platform exceed 
the benefits that the customer and merchant derive from using it. Second, an 
increase in the fees that a platform charges merchants has no effect on 
consumers’ incentives to use the platform as long as merchants continue to 
accept its cards.138 By contrast, if steering were allowed, merchants could be 
expected to respond to the higher fees by increasing their steering efforts, which 
would place additional competitive pressure on the platform. Third, a platform 
can use some of the increased merchant fees to finance consumer rewards that 
promote increased overutilization of the platform.139 The costs of the 
incremental transactions to merchants may exceed the benefits of the 
incremental transactions to consumers, so that, on net, user welfare falls. In the 
presence of the no-steering rules, a merchant has no way to induce a consumer 
to forgo platform transactions that destroy value from the joint perspective of 
the consumer and merchant. This situation stands in stark contrast to purchasing 
shoes, where an additional purchase will be made only if the combined benefits 
of the left and right shoe purchases exceed the combined costs. 
The allegation in American Express was, and the district court found, that 
the no-steering provisions harm merchants by reducing price competition on 
the merchant side among credit card networks and by making it unprofitable 
for rival credit and charge card networks (notably Discover) to compete by 
charging low merchant (and cardholder) fees.140 It is unclear whether on 
balance the no-steering provisions increase or decrease output. On the one 
 
135 Edelman & Wright, supra note 134, at 1285. 
136 Id. 
137 Schwartz & Vincent, supra note 134, provide an analysis of how no-steering provisions 
enable a card network to tax merchants’ customers who do not use that payment card. 
138 Edelman & Wright, supra note 134, at 1285. 
139 Id. 
140 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 213-14 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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hand, the provisions are likely to increase the use of Amex cards because the 
provisions prohibit merchants from discouraging the use of Amex cards. On 
the other hand, the provisions are likely to reduce use of competing cards; and, 
because the no-steering provisions reduce competition among card networks, 
they might prevent output increases driven by price and quality improvements 
that might otherwise result from increased competition among the networks. 
In any event, the change in output has not been shown to be an economically 
valid measure of the effects of the rules on consumer welfare. 
Given the novelty of the issues before the Court, it was premature for the 
Court to hold that an output test based on one-sided logic should be applied 
to two-sided transaction platforms. Good common law practice would have 
been to limit the opinion to asserting that the plaintiffs had failed to 
demonstrate harm in this particular instance, perhaps noting that, among 
other things, plaintiffs had not demonstrated that American Express’s 
conduct restricted output. 
The Court also failed to consider institutional factors that should have 
informed its decision with respect to an output test. Because the no-steering 
provisions had been in effect for more than 60 years, there was no good 
before-and-after benchmark against which to assess output effects, so 
focusing on changes in output would not help the court determine whether 
the no-steering rules themselves increased or decreased output.141 The Court 
should have looked to measures of competitive effects that were susceptible 
to proof as a practical matter. 
*      *      * 
In summary, if as a matter of substance the competitive effects of the no-
steering provisions could be assessed only by comparing the total two-sided 
price to the competitive price or by determining whether the provisions had 
reduced output compared to the but-for world, then the Court’s focus on 
those matters would have created a powerful default rule favoring defendants; 
but it might have been defensible as a means of avoiding arbitrary decisions 
 
141 The Court seemed to think that the no-steering provisions had led to increased output 
because the number of credit card transactions had increased in recent years. But the provisions had 
been in effect since the 1950s. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283 (2018). Clearly, many 
factors unrelated to the no-steering provisions have caused an increase in output in recent years. 
The issue was not whether output had increased over time, perhaps because of increased population, 
consumer spending, and other factors unrelated to the no steering provisions. The issue was whether 
output had increased more or less than it would have absent those provisions. Moreover, it can be 
inferred—from the district court’s finding that the no steering provisions excluded innovative, low-
price competition to American Express—that the provisions might have prevented an increase in 
output that would otherwise have occurred. The absence of that increase would not be reflected in 
a decrease in output over time, which is what the Court required the plaintiff to prove. 
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and false positives. However, the price and output tests on which the Court 
focused are themselves flawed and are as a substantive matter not reliable 
ways of assessing competitive effects. Moreover, even if the price and output 
tests the Court had in mind were sound in theory, the Court’s approach was 
flawed because it failed to consider important institutional factors. 
Theoretically sound tests are not useful if they cannot as a practical matter be 
applied using the kinds of evidence that are available in litigation. The Court 
should have asked whether, under the circumstances, plaintiffs’ evidence and 
the district court’s fact-finding were enough to meet the plaintiffs’ burden to 
show injury to competition in the first step of the rule of reason. 
4. The No-Steering Rules Protected Amex Good Will and Prevented Free 
Riding 
Although the Court described the issue in the case as whether plaintiffs 
had met their burden under step one of the rule of reason,142 the Court 
discussed American Express’s purported justifications for the no-steering 
provisions, which ordinarily are a matter for step two. In what might therefore 
have been dicta, the Court asserted that steering by some merchants would 
make consumers reluctant to use Amex cards generally, giving rise to an 
“externality” that “endangers the viability of the entire Amex network” and 
“undermines the investments that Amex has made to encourage increased 
cardholder spending.”143 
In support of its assertion, the Court cited an earlier case that had noted the 
unexceptional proposition that, under certain circumstances, “vertical restraints 
can prevent retailers from free riding.”144 The Court cited neither evidence 
showing that the no-steering rules solved or ameliorated an actual free riding 
problem nor evidence in support of its assertion that the viability of the Amex 
network was threatened or that eliminating the rules would reduce cardholder 
rewards. In fact, evidence presented at trial indicated that the Amex network 
would remain viable if the no-steering rules were prohibited and that American 
Express might respond to merchant steering by increasing cardholder rewards 
because of the increased competitive pressure it would face.145 
 
142 Id. at 2284 (“[T]he parties ask us to decide whether the plaintiffs have carried their initial 
burden of proving that Amex’s antisteering provisions have an anticompetitive effect.”). 
143 Id. at 2289. 
144 Id. at 2289-90 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890-
91 (2007)). 
145 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 238 (“[A]s one Amex executive 
testified, the network may choose to increase its investments in rewards in order to make its 
cardholders more resistant to merchants’ efforts to steer them to other card brands.”). The court also 
cited an American Express business document identifying increased rewards as a response to 
steering toward debit cards. Id. 
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With regard to the possibility of free riding, the district court correctly 
acknowledged that prevention of free-riding is a legitimate, pro-competitive 
justification for vertical restraints, but it found that American Express’s free-riding 
arguments were not supported by the facts.146 More generally, while the district 
court said that it is unclear whether, and if so under what circumstances, benefits 
on one side of a platform can as a matter of law offset or justify harm on the other 
side, it held that American Express had failed in any event to prove such benefits: 
However, even if such cross-market balancing is appropriate under the rule 
of reason in a two-sided context, here Defendants have failed to establish that 
the [no-steering provisions] are reasonably necessary to robust competition 
on the cardholder side of the [general purpose credit and charge] platform, 
or that any such gains offset the harm done in the network services market.147 
Moreover, not only did the Supreme Court’s assertions about the benefits 
of the no-steering rules lack factual support, they also reflected a failure by 
the Court, once again, to address the substantive question of what kinds of 
purported justifications are relevant to determining whether the challenged 
no-steering provisions harm competition. Plaintiffs alleged that the 
provisions harmed interbrand competition by reducing the incentive of 
American Express and rival credit card networks to compete on price.148 The 
justifications credited by the Court, however, focused solely on the effect of 
the provisions on American Express. The Court focused on the platform, 
rather than on the market. In effect, the Court made the fundamental 
antitrust error of confusing harm to a competitor (American Express if the 
rules were prohibited) with harm to competition.149 
Given the district court’s findings that the no-steering provisions reduced 
price competition and led to higher merchant fees, however, a cognizable 
justification would have to show that the provisions had offsetting benefits 
for competition among credit card providers as a whole. The Court did not 
 
146 See id. at 235. The district court stated, 
The Supreme Court has recognized that prevention of free-riding is a legitimate, pro-
competitive justification for vertical restraints on trade.	.	.	. Here, however, to the extent 
Defendants have identified potential avenues of free-riding foreclosed by its [no-steering 
rules], the court finds that the competitive benefits	.	.	. do not offset the significantly more 
pervasive harms done to interbrand competition by the same restraints. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
147 Id. at 229-30 (footnotes omitted). 
148 Id. at 208-12 (explaining how the no-steering rules reduce incentives of credit card networks 
to compete on price). 
149 As the Supreme Court famously put it, the antitrust laws “were enacted for ‘the protection 
of competition, not competitors,’” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc,, 429 U.S. 477, 488 
(1977) (Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S., 294, 320 (1962)). 
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focus on that issue150 and also failed to address whether, if there were a 
potential free-riding problem, less-restrictive alternatives could have solved 
it. 
The Court’s treatment of justifications was not only substantively 
inappropriate but also inappropriate in the light of institutional considerations 
that should have informed its decision. By presuming efficiencies without 
evidentiary support, the Court in effect placed on plaintiffs the burden of 
proving the absence of such efficiencies. Doing so reduced the likelihood of 
a sound decision because it put on the party with inferior access to evidence 
a burden of proving a negative. The Court’s own description of the rule of 
reason correctly and wisely stated that “the burden shifts to the defendant to 
show” efficiency justifications.151 
VI. APPLE V. PEPPER AND THE UNCERTAIN LEGACY OF THE AMERICAN 
EXPRESS CASE 
In the light of the facts that American Express affords favorable treatment 
to defendants found to be transaction platforms and that the underlying 
definition of transaction platform is imprecise, it is not surprising that 
antitrust defendants argue that their cases involve transaction platforms that 
should be governed by the new rules set forth by the Court in American Express. 
In Steward Health Care System LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island, 
for example, the defendant argued in a motion for reconsideration that, “[t]his 
market clearly satisfies the Court’s criteria for a transaction-platform market. 
Health plans intermediate transactions between subscribers and providers, 
and both sides of the market are characterized by network effects; subscriber 
demand is a function of provider breadth, and provider demand is in turn a 
function of subscriber volume.”152 
Defendants have made similar arguments in numerous other cases.153 And 
in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., the court overturned a jury verdict 
 
150 The Court did say that “Amex’s business model has spurred robust interbrand competition and 
has increased the quality and quantity of credit-card transactions.” Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 
2274, 2290 (2018). However, it cited in support of that proposition only evidence that the percentage of 
consumers holding credit cards increased between 1970 and 2001 and that industry sales increased 
between 2008 and 2013. Id. at 2288-89. Those facts prove little given that much of the challenged conduct 
had been in effect since the 1950s. Id. at 2283. The Court made no attempt to assess what growth rates 
for either cardholding or credit card transactions would have been in the absence of that conduct. 
151 Id. at 2284. 
152 Motion for Reconsideration of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I. at 26, Steward Health 
Care Sys. LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., No. 13-cv-405 (D.R.I. July 2, 2018). 
153 See Victoria Graham, Goldman, NCAA Test Limits of AmEx Two-Sided Antitrust Defense, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 26, 2020, 3:15 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-
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in favor of the plaintiff and remanded the case for retrial in the light of the 
new rules set forth in American Express.154 
In a different case involving Sabre, the district court applied its 
understanding of the American Express decision to a proposed merger.155 Sabre 
operates a platform that, among other things, connects airlines with travel 
agencies for online reservations.156 It proposed to acquire Farelogix, which 
sells to airlines products that facilitate direct communications and transactions 
between airlines and travel agents.157 The court found that, as a matter of fact, 
Sabre and Farelogix were actual and potential competitors158 and that each 
regarded the other as a competitor.159 Nevertheless, the court held that, “as a 
matter of antitrust law, Sabre, which is a two-sided platform facilitating 
transactions between airlines and travel agencies, does not compete with 
Farelogix, which indisputably only interacts with airlines and is not a two-
sided platform,” in a relevant market!160 That holding runs directly counter to 
the purpose of defining a relevant market, which is to identify the sources of 
competition faced by the firm under consideration. The court based that 
holding on its interpretation of the assertion in the American Express decision 
that “[o]nly other two-sided platforms can compete with a two-sided platform 
for transactions.”161 As we observed above, it is not clear what the Supreme 
Court meant by that statement.162 It does seem clear, however, that the conflict 
between the Sabre court’s factual findings and its interpretation of the 
Supreme Court’s statement in American Express reflects at least in part the 
abstract and incautious nature of the opinion in American Express. The Court 
made broad statements not rooted in the facts of the case and appears not to 
have considered how its broad statements might be understood or applied by 
courts in future and different cases and whether they might give rise to 
unintended consequences, such as defining markets too narrowly. 
It is thus not hard to imagine that American Express could wind up being a 
very important turning point in the application of the antitrust laws to two-
sided markets because of the Court’s broad, prescriptive language and relative 
inattention to the particular facts found by the district court. At the same time, 
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the significance of American Express is in doubt in the light of the very next 
antitrust case decided by the Supreme Court, Apple Inc. v. Pepper.163 
The plaintiffs in Apple were consumers who alleged that Apple had unlawfully 
monopolized the sale of apps for Apple devices through its App Store and had 
used that power to charge excessive prices for apps.164 It is difficult to imagine how 
the App Store could fail to be a transaction platform if American Express’s credit 
and charge card network is one. Each facilitates transactions between buyers (app 
purchasers and card-carrying consumers, respectively) and sellers (app producers 
and merchants, respectively) and keeps a percentage of the sales price of the 
transactions completed over the platform.165 
Although Apple involved a transaction platform, neither the majority nor 
the dissent in that case mentioned American Express. Nor did either address 
the question whether Apple involved a two-sided transaction market. 
The majority in Apple seemed to reject the holding of American Express that 
the relevant price is the “two-sided” price.166 Although the majority noted that 
Apple charged app developers an annual membership fee,167 it characterized 
the case as a “retailer commission case,”168 described the alleged harm to 
competition as Apple exercising “monopoly power in the retail market for the 
sale of apps .	.	. to force iPhone owners to pay Apple higher-than-competitive 
prices for apps,”169 and said that, if the plaintiffs “prevail, they will be entitled 
to the full amount of the unlawful overcharge that they paid to Apple.”170 The 
majority did not refer to the two-sided price or consider the possibility that the 
increased commission might have been offset by a reduced app developer fee.171 
The Court was, to be sure, addressing a different issue. The issue in Apple 
was whether, in the light of the Court’s earlier decision in Illinois Brick,172 the 
plaintiffs could collect damages from the platform if the conduct was illegal; 
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the issue in American Express was whether the conduct of the platform was 
illegal. But in its discussion of the Illinois Brick issue the majority in Apple 
notably ignored American Express: 
Here, some downstream iPhone consumers have sued Apple on a monopoly 
theory. And it could be that some upstream app developers will also sue 
Apple on a monopsony theory. In this instance, the two suits would rely on 
fundamentally different theories of harm and would not assert dueling claims 
to a “common fund,” as that term was used in Illinois Brick.173 
To the contrary, if the American Express Court were correct in its holding 
that a transaction platform sells a single product—transactions—and that the 
price of the product is an aggregate of the prices charged to users on both 
sides of the platform, then unlawfully high prices would by definition 
establish a common fund, the size of which would depend on the extent to 
which the unlawful conduct increased the two-sided price. Under the 
American Express standard, an overcharge on the consumer side would not, in 
isolation, be a proper measure of antitrust injury.174 
Moreover, the majority opinion exhibits an even deeper conflict with the 
American Express approach. In examining American Express’s conduct, the Court 
focused on the price and output of its transaction service, which facilitates 
interactions between consumers and merchants. The American Express court did 
not focus on the prices charged by the merchants for the products or services they 
were selling. By contrast, in Apple, the majority focused on the “retail price 
charged to consumers” for the products that were sold through transactions 
facilitated by the platform (i.e., apps sold through the App Store), rather than 
focusing on the price of the transaction service itself.175 
There is also tension between the dissent in Apple and the decision in 
American Express. The dissent ignored the fact that, under American Express, 
users on both sides of a transaction platform are direct purchasers. Instead, the 
dissent focused on the formality of who initially pays the commission, 
asserting that: 
The problem is that the 30% commission falls initially on the developers. So 
if the commission is in fact a monopolistic overcharge, the developers are the 
parties who are directly injured by it. Plaintiffs can be injured only if the 
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175 Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1521. 
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developers are able and choose to pass on the overcharge to them in the form 
of higher app prices that the developers alone control.176 
In addressing only the passing on of the nominal overcharge, the dissent 
ignored the issue of the two-sided price. The dissenting Justices (all of whom 
were in the majority in American Express) did not question whether an overcharge 
on one side (the 30% commission initially falling on developers) might itself 
constitute antitrust injury, nor did they inquire whether the allegedly inflated 
commission was accompanied by a change in the price charged to consumers.177 
It is too early for any real conclusion, but the absence of any consideration 
of American Express by either the majority or the dissent in Apple certainly casts 
doubt on the significance of American Express to the common law evolution of 
antitrust law. If so, one reason might be the American Express Court’s departure 
from sound antitrust adjudication—in particular, its prescribing broad rules that 
were not well grounded in either judicial experience or academic learning and 
its failure to take account of the institutional considerations that should figure 
importantly in antitrust decisions.178 
CONCLUSION 
American Express made new law that resolved matters as to which there 
were no precedents. We believe that the Court made several major 
substantive errors, but our primary point in this Article is that, regardless of 
whether the Court reached the right result, it did not do a good job of 
participating in the common law-like process for the evolution of antitrust 
law that Congress created and the courts have used for more than 100 years. 
In a common law process, cases are decided on the facts, and legal 
principles are induced from such decisions. In such a process, the Supreme 
Court might prescribe broad rules when they reflect both accumulated 
judicial experience and, at least in antitrust law (which is unique in the extent 
to which legal doctrine itself embodies empirical and often contingent 
economic propositions), substantial consensus about the relevant economic 
learning and how best to reflect that learning in legal rules. Absent such 
experience and consensus, a wise common law court, including the Supreme 
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Court, should proceed cautiously, pay careful attention to the facts of the case, 
and decide cases narrowly. 
In American Express, the Court prescribed broad, new principles (for 
example, its characterization of the rule of reason, the requirements that a 
market must be defined in all vertical cases and that the market must include 
both sides in a transaction-platform case, and the Court’s broad statement 
about what must be proven to establish harm to competition) in the absence 
of significant relevant judicial experience and on the basis of academic 
scholarship that neither constituted a consensus view nor adequately 
addressed the key question of how the economic insights might best be 
reflected in legal rules. The Court lacked humility in prescribing new rules 
in a case of first impression and in cavalierly distinguishing the closest 
precedents. The Court made new law without addressing how its new rules 
might further the substantive purposes of the law in future antitrust cases and 
without asking whether its new rules would increase judicial accuracy, avoid 
unnecessary complexity and burdens, and increase predictability of the law. 
As it happens, every one of the Court’s controversial rulings and 
departures from sound common law adjudication benefitted the defendants. 
Its decision to review the case extended the precedential significance of the 
Second Circuit’s decision. Its restatement of the rule of reason added the 
implication that the defendant wins if it can show any procompetitive benefit, 
no matter how insignificant and no matter how great the harm to competition 
caused by its conduct. The Court’s requirements that relevant markets must 
be proven in all cases involving vertical restraints and that the market must 
include both sides of a transaction platform put an additional and very likely 
difficult and often unnecessary burden on plaintiffs. Its requirement that 
harm to competition in a transaction-platform case requires proof of two-
sided prices above competitive levels or of reduced output places what can be 
an impossibly difficult burden of proof on plaintiffs and rejects the likely 
possibility that harm to competition can in some transaction-platform cases 
be shown by other kinds of proof. Finally, its readiness to credit defendant’s 
purported justification without serious factual inquiry makes defending 
against claimed justifications very difficult. 
An outside observer might speculate that the majority was motivated more 
by a desire to embed its preconceptions in the law than by a desire to decide the 
case before it as a participant in the common law-like evolution of antitrust law. 
